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ARTICLES 
CONTROLLING DISCRETION BY 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGULATIONS: 
THE USE, MISUSE, AND NONUSE 
OF POLICE RULES AND POLICIES 
IN FOURTH AMENDMENT ADJUDICATION 
Wayne R. LaFave * 
In assaying fourth amendment jurisprudence, it is useful to take 
into account available knowledge regarding the actual search and 
seizure practices of the police. Especially helpful is the perspective 
afforded by the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administra-
tion of Criminal Justice in the United States, 1 which ranks as the pre-
eminent empirical study of law enforcement procedures in this 
country. Despite the fact - or, more likely, because of the fact -
that the ABF Survey was published over twenty years ago, certain 
insights from that study highlight some recent and significant changes 
in this corpus juris inconstans. 
Clearly "the most important single finding of the Survey" was 
"how hard it is to make accurate straightforward statements about 
criminal law administration" because of the previously unperceived 
"complexity"· of that process.2 That complexity, the Survey estab-
lished, attends activities of the police that implicate the fourth amend-
ment. In deciding whether to make an arrest or other seizure of a 
person and whether to search for or seize property, the police are in 
* David C. Baum Professor of Law and Center for Advanced Study Professor of Law, Uni· 
versity of Illinois. B.S. 1957, LL.B. 1959, S.J.D. 1965, University of Wisconsin. - Ed. I have 
benefited greatly from the comments of Herman Goldstein, Lloyd Ohlin, Frank Remington, and 
Victor Rosenblum. An abridged version of this article will later appear as a chapter in a book· 
length retrospective on the American Bar Foundation's Survey of the Administration of Crimi-
nal Justice in the United States. 
1. The results of the Survey were published in five volumes. In chronological order by sub· 
ject matter, they are: L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, DETECTION OF CRIME: 
STOPPING AND QUE5TIONING, SEARCH AND SEIZURE, ENCOURAGEMENT AND ENTRAPMENT 
(F. Remington ed. 1967); W. LAFAVE, ARREST: THE DECISION TO TAKE A SUSPECT INTO 
CUSTODY (F. Remington ed. 1965); F. MILLER, PROSECUTION: THE DECISION TO CHARGE A 
SUSPECT WITH A CRIME (F. Remington ed. 1969); D. NEWMAN, CONVICTION: THE DETERMl· 
NATION OF GUILT OR INNOCENCE WITHOUT TRIAL (F. Remington ed. 1966); R. DAWSON, 
SENTENCING: THE DECISION AS TO TYPE, LENGTH, AND CONDmONS OF SENTENCE (F. Rem-
ington ed. 1969). 
2. Epilogue to the Survey, in F. MILLER, supra note l, at 351, 351-52. 
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actuality called upon to make decisions which are quite varied in their 
character and effect and which are influenced by a vast range of fac-
tors and considerations. 3 
Because courts in the pre-Survey days did not perceive this com-
plexity, the fourth amendment jurisprudence of that era was decidedly 
one-dimensional. What Frank Allen has called "the process of 'factu-
alization' in search and seizure cases"4 had barely begun, and conse-
quently the Supreme Court's decisions during that period treated the 
fourth amendment "as a monolith: whenever it restricts police activi-
ties at all, it subjects them to the same ... restrictions."5 Illustrative is 
Henry v. United States, 6 where FBI agents investigating a theft from 
an interstate shipment kept suspect Pierotti and his companion Henry 
under surveillance and saw them on two occasions loading cartons 
from a private residence. The agents then stopped the vehicle in 
which the two were riding and overheard Henry instruct Pierotti to 
tell the agents that he (Pierotti) had "just picked me up." Over the 
objection of the two dissenters that "this Court is not bound by the 
Government's mistakes,"7 the Henry majority accepted the prosecu-
tion's inexplicable concession that the stopping of the car constituted 
an "arrest," for which probable cause was lacking. That characteriza-
tion made irrelevant "what transpired at or after the time the car was 
stopped."8 
Henry stands in sharp contrast to the post-Survey decision in Terry 
v. Ohio, 9 which expressly rejected the contention "that there is not -
and cannot be - a variety of police activity which does not depend 
solely upon the voluntary cooperation of the citizen and yet which 
stops short of an arrest based upon probable cause to make such an 
arrest." 10 Significantly, the Terry majority drew upon the findings of 
the ABF Survey regarding the complexity of the stop-and-frisk activi-
ties of the police to support an important conclusion regarding the 
application of the exclusionary rule to such conduct. Emphasizing 
that "street encounters between citizens and police officers are incredi-
bly rich in diversity" and "are initiated by the police for a wide variety 
3. See generally w. LAFAVE, supra note 1; L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, 
supra note 1. 
4. Allen, The Wolf Case: Search and Seizure, Federalism, and the Civil Liberties, 45 ILL. L. 
REV. l, 4 (1950). 
5. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 388 (1974). 
6. 361 U.S. 98 (1959). 
7. 361 U.S. at 105 (Clark, J., and the Chief Justice, dissenting). 
8. 361 U.S. at 104. 
9. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
10. 392 U.S. at 11. 
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of purposes, some of which are wholly unrelated to a desire to prose-
cute for crime," the Supreme Court concluded that not all such activ-
ity is 
responsive to the exclusionary rule. Regardless of how effective the rule 
may be where obtaining convictions is an important objective of the po-
lice, it is powerless to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed 
rights where the police either have no interest in prosecuting or are will-
ing to forgo successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other 
goal.11 
The Terry decision is admittedly somewhat unique, as not all the 
Supreme Court's post-Survey fourth amendment decisions manifest a 
comparable understanding of the complexity of the search and seizure 
activities of the police. It is nonetheless a fair generalization that the 
Court now has a much greater appreciation of this complexity than it 
did at the time of Henry. Whether by examination of the now-avail-
able empirical data (as in Terry) or simply by virtue of the steady diet 
of fourth amendment cases which followed in the wake of Mapp v. 
Ohio, 12 allowing the Supreme Court to "see in the round rather than 
the flat" 13 the fourth amendment conduct of the police, the Court now 
understands how rich and varied this activity is in real life. Allen's 
"process of 'factualization' " has moved forward in fourth amendment 
jurisprudence; the Supreme Court is now much more willing to judge 
discrete search or seizure activity on its own terms. 14 
Yet another recurring theme in the ABF Criminal Justice Survey 
concerns "the relatively wide discretion 15 that officials have in enforc-
ing the criminal law." 16 Of particular interest here is that discretion in 
the criminal process which prior to the Survey17 had been least visible: 
that exercised by police in determining when and how to enforce the 
11. 392 U.S. at 13-14 (footnote omitted). 
12. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
13. K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADmON 263 (1960). 
14. For further discussion of this development, see LaFave, Being Frank About the Fourth: 
On Allen's ''Process of 'Factua/ization' in the Search and Seizure Cases," 85 MICH. L. REV. 427 
(1986). 
IS. See K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE 4 (1969) ("A public officer has discretion when-
ever the effective limits on his power leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of 
action or inaction."). 
16. Epilogue to the Survey, supra note 2, at 352. 
17. In the years since the Survey, however, the matter of police discretion has been the sub-
ject of intense scrutiny in the literature. See, e.g., Discretion in Law Enforcement, 47 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 1. For a most useful selective bibliography on police dis-
cretion, listing approximately 150 reports, books, and articles, see Center, Police Discretion: A 
Selected Bibliography, Discretion in Law Enforcement, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 
1984, at 303. 
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law.18 Much of that discretion has to do with determining how to 
invoke the criminal process and when to use a variety of investigative 
techniques, and thus falls within the realm of fourth amendment activ-
ity. Included here are such decisions as whether to undertake a custo-
dial arrest, 19 whether to persist in that attempt by using force,20 
whether to stop a suspect for investigation,21 and whether to conduct a 
search.22 
In the pre-Survey search and seizure decisions of the Supreme 
Court, the Court was largely oblivious to the discretionary practices of 
the police and the risks they posed to fourth amendment interests. Il-
lustrative is Harris v. United States, 23 holding that FBI agents lawfully 
searched defendant's entire apartment "incident to" his arrest there. 
The Harris majority reassured that this was not "a case in which law-
enforcement officers have entered premises ostensibly for the purpose 
of making an arrest but in reality for the purpose of conducting a gen-
eral exploratory search."24 That comment, of course, overlooks the 
fact that police routinely exercise discretion whether to arrest perpe-
trators at their home or elsewhere. Further, the choice in a particular 
case to arrest at home, because it is readily explainable in terms of the 
arrest purpose, could easily be legitimated even if primarily motivated 
by the opportunity to "piggyback" onto the arrest another, far greater 
fourth amendment intrusion - a full but warrantless search of the 
dwelling.25 The post-Survey decisions of the Supreme Court are not 
consistently of a better sort; true, Harris has been overruled,26 but 
other decisions with the vice of Harris can be found. 27 But at least the 
term "police discretion" has now entered the Supreme Court's lexi-
con,28 and in recent years (as I discuss later in this article) the Court 
has sometimes expressly recognized that limits ·upon that discretion 
are essential to the protection of fourth amendment values. 
Given the complex and discretionary character of police search 
and seizure decisions, some limitations on this power are essential. 
18. See generally w. LAFAVE, supra note 1; L. TIFFANY, D. McINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, 
supra note 1. 
19. W. LAFAVE, supra note l, at 168-207. 
20. Id. at 208-26. 
21. L. TIFFANY, D. MCINTYRE & D. ROTENBERG, supra note 1, at 5-94. 
22. Id. at 95-205. 
23. 33fU.S. 145 (1947). 
24. 331 U.S. at 153. 
25. See generally W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 41-43. 
26. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 768 (1969). 
27. E.g .• New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
28. See, e.g., Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). 
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The issue, however, is not discretion versus no discretion, but rather 
how this discretion should be confined, structured and checked. As 
Professor Kenneth Davis once put it: "Half the problem is to cut back 
unnecessary discretionary power. The other half is to find effective 
ways to control necessary discretionary power."29 One important con-
clusion of the ABF Survey is that this bipartite challenge cannot be 
completely and successfully met by the legislative and judicial 
branches alone; the police themselves are perceived to have an impor-
tant role to play. As the ABF Survey concludes, "police ought to ac-
knowledge their exercise of discretion and reduce their enforcement 
policies to writing and subject them to a continuing process of critical 
re-evaluation. "30 
Over the twenty-five intervening years, this has occurred to an im-
measurable but noticeable degree.31 As one recent assessment put it: 
"Historically, law enforcement investigative practices were informal 
and seldom, if ever, reduced to writing. In the past few years this has 
changed and now, increasingly, enforcement agencies record enforce-
ment practices in written form, usually referring to the written state-
ments as 'guidelines.' "32 This accounts for yet another distinction 
between pre-Survey and post-Survey fourth amendment jurisprudence: 
only in the more recent era have courts sometimes considered police 
regulations in ruling upon search and seizure issues. 
For the reasons detailed in the next section, police rulemaking re-
garding their fourth amendment activities is a highly desirable under-
taking. This being so, it is appropriate to consider whether or not the 
29. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 51 (emphasis in original). 
30. W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 513. 
31. See H. GOLDSTEIN, POLICING A FREE SOCIETY 117 (1977) (noting "a number of police 
agencies - most notably those in Washington, D.C., Dayton, Ohio, Madison, Wisconsin, and 
Boston, Massachusetts - have embarked upon ambitious efforts to develop guidelines for their 
personnel"); Caplan, The Case for Rulemaking by Law Enforcement Agencies, 36 LA w & CON· 
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1971, at 500, 502 (on the District of Columbia's orders governing eye-
witness identification of suspects and automobile searches); Mertens & Wasserstrom, The Good 
Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 
GEO. L.J. 365, 399-400 (1981) (on the District of Columbia's regulations on traffic stops); Quinn, 
The Effect of Police Rulemaking on the Scope of Fourth Amendment Rights, 52 J. URB. L. 25, 26-
27 n.9 (1974) (noting developments in D.C., San Diego, Dayton, Los Angeles, Memphis, and San 
Antonio). 
The rulemaking movement was advanced by the publication in 1974 of a series of pamphlets 
containing Model Rules for Law Enforcement on a variety of topics. The pamphlet titles are: 
Search Warrant Execution; Stop and Frisk; Wa"antless Searches of Persons and Places; Searches, 
Seizures and Inventories of Motor Vehicles; Release of Arrest and Conviction Records; and Eyewit· 
ness Identification. The Project's Advisory Board consisted of representatives of the police de-
partments of Cincinnati; Dade County, Fla.; Dallas; Dayton; District of Columbia; Kansas City, 
Mo.; Oakland; Phoenix; San Antonio; San Diego; and San Jose. 
32. F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, H. GOLDSTEIN & W. DICKEY, CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE ADMINISTRATION 153 (rev. ed. 1982). 
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judicial branch has a part to play in that enterprise. The answer, quite 
obviously, is yes: courts "have a role in stimulating this administrative 
process and reviewing its products."33 It is the performance to date of 
this role by the courts (especially the Supreme Court) which consti-
tutes the focus of this article. More specifically, I consider: To what 
extent have the courts performed the "stimulating" function by man-
dating or encouraging police policymaking? To what extent have the 
courts performed the "reviewing" function to ensure that law enforce-
ment regulations accomplish the hoped for benefits of rulemaking? 
And, more generally, precisely how has the existence or nonexistence 
of police rules influenced the quality and character of fourth amend-
ment jurisprudence? 
I. POLICE RULEMAKING AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT 
"The police," Kenneth Davis once commented, "are among the 
most important policy-makers of our entire society. And they make 
far more discretionary determinations in individual cases than any 
other class of administrators; I know of no close second."34 As the 
pervasiveness of this police discretion became more widely known, 
there arose in many quarters the understandable concern that this vast 
discretion must be limited and controlled. To accomplish this, many 
have concluded, a system of rulemaking by law enforcement agencies 
themselves is imperative. The case for rulemaking has been made by 
many tho1:1ghtful commentators, including Judge Carl McGowan35 
and Professors Anthony Amsterdam, 36 Herman Goldstein, 37 and 
Kenneth Davis. 38 Rulemaking has been advocated in such law reform 
efforts as the ALI's Pre-Arraignment Code39 and the ABA's Criminal 
Justice Standards,40 and in such influential studies as those by the 
President's Commission on Law Enforcement and Administration of 
33. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 785, 813 (1970). 
34. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 222 (footnote omitted). 
35. McGowan, Rule-Making and the Police, 10 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972). 
36. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 409-39; Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 810-15. 
37. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 106-26; Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation: A Propo-
sal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REv. 1123 (1967); Goldstein, Trial Judges 
and the Police, 14 CRIME & DELINQ. 14, 22-25 (1968). 
38. K. DAVIS, supra note 15, at 52-161; K. DAVIS, POLICE DISCRETION 98-138 (1975). 
39. AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, A MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE 
§ 10.3 (1975). 
40. 1 AMERICAN BAR AssOCIATION, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE§ 1-4.3 (2d ed. 
supp. 1986). 
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Justice41 and the National Advisory Commission on Criminal Justice 
Standards and Goals.42 Consequently, this article need not establish 
the need for development of guidelines by police agencies; it will suf-
fice to summarize the case already made. 
In some of this writing (especially that of Kenneth Davis), the em-
phasis is upon that police discretion related to the substantive criminal 
law - that is, law enforcement decisions not to invoke the criminal 
process against certain individuals who have apparently violated some 
provision in the penal code. This is police discretion of the lowest 
possible visibility, and it is a form of police discretion that traditionally 
has not been a subject of judicial oversight and that, by its nature, does 
not readily lend itself to such supervision. Given these circumstances, 
it is difficult to quarrel with the proposition that meaningful reform 
makes necessary resort to a regime of police rulemaking.43 It may be 
less apparent that the development of guidelines by the police them-
selves is essential with respect to their fourth amendment activities. 
After all, at least since Mapp v. Ohio 44 the courts, through the mecha-
nism of the exclusionary rule, have had the responsibility for defining 
the fourth amendment limits of police power and for imposing the 
suppression sanction when those limits have been exceeded. The ex-
clusionary rule "assures a great deal of judicial attention"45 to such 
police practices and thus has resulted in considerable judicial elabora-
tion of fourth amendment requirements, 46 culminating in an "enor-
mous increase in police training and education about constitutional 
rights."47 Thus, police rulemaking might appear superfluous at best. 
That is not the case, however. To appreciate this, it is helpful to 
begin with an understanding that this traditional, virtually exclusive 
reliance upon the judiciary for the formulation of fourth amendment 
standards cannot be taken as an apodictic manifestation that courts 
41. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, TASK 
FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 18-21 (1967) [hereinafter TASK FORCE REPORT]. 
42. NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMN. ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS, PO-
LICE 21-28 (1973). 
43. For the advantages of rulemaking in that context, see K. DA VIS, supra note 15, at 90-91. 
44. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
45. Paulsen, The Exclusionary Rule and Misconduct by the Police, 52 J. CRIM. L. CRIMINOL-
OGY & POLICE SCI. 255, 260 (1961). 
46. Regarding the California experience, see Traynor, Mapp v. Ohio at Large in the Fifty 
States, 1962 DUKE L.J. 319, 323; for the Illinois experience, see LaFave, Improving Police Per-
formance Through the Exclusionary Rule - Part IL· Defining the Norms and Training the Police, 
30 Mo. L. REV. 566, 580-81 n.63 (1965). 
47. Sachs, The Exclusionary Rule: A Prosecutor's Defense, 1 CRIM. JUST. ETHICS 28, 31 
(1982). 
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7 
possess singular omniscience on these matters. To the contrary, as 
Amsterdam has pointed out, this judicial activism 
has been the almost inevitable consequence of the failure of other agen-
cies of law to assume responsibility for regulating police practices. In 
most areas of constitutional law the Supreme Court of the United States 
plays a back-stopping role, reviewing the ultimate permissibility of dis-
positions and policies guided in the first instance by legislative enact-
ments, administrative rules or local common-law traditions. In the area 
of controls upon the police, a vast abnegation of responsibility at the 
level of each of these ordinary sources of legal rulemaking has forced the 
Court to construct all the law regulating the everyday functioning of the 
police.48 
In the face of this phenomenon, there is no reason to doubt the conten-
tion that a "new allocation of responsibilities is required" and that the 
role of the Supreme Court (and courts generally) "is better adapted to 
review than to initiation."49 Indeed, that contention - which 
presumes a process of administrative regulation at the police level -
makes especially good sense in the fourth amendment area. 
The fourth amendment, whether viewed in terms of its preconsti-
tutional history or its current interpretation by the Supreme Court, is 
concerned with indiscriminate searches and seizures of two types: (i) 
"unjustified searches and seizures," that is, those where "an adequate 
justification" for such intrusion has not been shown; and (ii) "arbitrary 
searches and seizures," that is, those "conducted at the discretion of 
executive officials, who may act despotically and capriciously in the 
exercise of the power to search and seize."50 The first of these con-
cerns is reflected in the explicit and familiar fourth amendment re-
quirement of "probable cause," while the second is manifested by the 
amendment's interpretation "as another harbinger of the Equal Pro-
tection Clause, concerned with avoiding indefensible inequities in 
treatment."51 Protection against arbitrary searches and seizures lies in 
controlling police discretion, which requires a determination that the 
police action taken against a particular individual corresponds to that 
which occurs with respect to other persons similarly situated. Judicial 
assessment of just what the category is (that is, who else really is "sim-
ilarly situated") and whether or not like cases in fact receive the same 
disposition will be more meaningful and reliable if the record in the 
case reveals a preexisting police regulation on the subject. 
48. Amsterdam, supra note 33, at 790. 
49. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Criminal Cases, 
1975 U. ILL. L.F. 518, 542. 
50. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 411. 
51. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 97 (1980). 
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A second characteristic of the fourth amendment is that the experi-
ence and expertise of the police, when adequately established in court, 
is properly taken into account in determining the legality of the chal-
lenged police conduct. 52 A process of police rulemaking makes it pos-
sible for the experience and expertise of the entire department to be 
focused upon the matter at issue and more effectively communicated 
to the reviewing court. As Goldstein has noted, if police policy has 
been made through a process of administrative rulemaking, then 
in the review of police practices initiated by a motion to suppress evi-
dence, a judge could promote a dialogue with the police by affording the 
law-enforcement agency an opportunity to justify and explain the prac-
tice at issue, thereby focusing judicial review upon the legality and pro-
priety of department policies rather than the actions of an individual 
officer. This would give the police an opportunity to articulate the expe-
rience and expertise influential in formulating their policies - factors to 
be considered in weighing the propriety of their actions. A judge fully 
informed on all of the circumstances related to a given police practice is 
obviously in a better position to pass judgment upon its legality and pro-
priety than one whose knowledge of the procedure is limited to what is 
revealed in the typical hearing on a motion to suppress evidence. 53 
Yet another characteristic of the fourth amendment (or, more pre-
cisely, of its exclusionary rule) is that only certain types of police 
search and seizure activity regularly come to the attention of the 
courts. Because the exclusionary rule ordinarily may be invoked only 
by a defendant in a criminal case, those police searches and seizures 
which are undertaken for purposes other than prosecution or which do 
not result in the discovery of evidence do not receive judicial scrutiny. 
As acknowledged in Terry v. Ohio, 54 the exclusionary rule "is power-
less to deter invasions of constitutionally guaranteed rights where the 
police either have no interest in prosecuting or are willing to forgo 
successful prosecution in the interest of serving some other goal," a 
not uncommon occurrence. 55 With respect to these practices, police 
52. E.g., United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 897 (1975) ("officers are entitled to draw 
reasonable inferences from these facts in light of their knowledge of the area and their prior 
experience with aliens and smugglers"). 
53. Goldstein, Trial Judges and the Police, supra note 37, at 24 (footnote omitted). 
54. 392 U.S. I, 14 (1968). 
55. Illustrative are 
arrest or confiscation as a punitive sanction (common in gambling and liquor law viola-
tions), arrest for the purpose of controlling prostitutes and transvestites, arrest of an intoxi-
cated person for his own safety, search for the purpose of recovering stolen property, arrest 
and search and seizure for the purpose of "keeping the lid on" in a high crime area or of 
satisfying public outcry for visible enforcement, search for the purpose of removing weapons 
or contraband such as narcotics from circulation, and search for weapons that might be used 
against the searching officer. 
Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI. L. REV. 665, 721-22 
(1970). 
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rulemaking is needed not so much as an aid to judicial oversight but 
rather (as with police nonenforcement decisions) because no other 
meaningful restraint on the activity of individual officers exists. The 
mere absence of routine judicial review of such activities does not 
mean that any police regulations adopted would merely approve the 
established practice. As Amsterdam warns, it is 
a grave mistake ... to assume that all of the things that policemen do in 
a state of rulelessness would continue to be done under a regime of rules. 
Many practices now tolerated in individual cases ... would not be ap-
proved or authorized by the police command structure itself if it were 
required to assume responsibility for determining the propriety of those 
practices as a general mode of departmental operation. 56 
Departmental policymaking regarding the fourth amendment ac-
tivities of police is desirable because it "improves police performance" 
in four major ways: (1) "Rulemaking enhances the quality of police 
decisions" because it focuses attention on the fact that policy is being 
made, promotes the placing of decisionmaking authority in responsible 
and capable hands, increases the seriousness with which police con-
front the implications of their practices for the efficiency of law en-
forcement and the liberty of citizens, promotes decisionmaking 
efficiency, and enhances police prestige and morale. (2) "Rulemaking 
tends to ensure the fair and equal treatment of citizens" because rules 
reduce the influence of bias, provide uniform standards for use in the 
training of personnel, and serve both to guide and to control police 
behavior. (3) "Rulemaking increases the visibility of police policy de-
cisions" because the rulemaking process requires the departmental 
command structure to learn what officers in the field are doing, and 
informs other governmental agencies and the public about what the 
police are doing. ( 4) "Rulemaking offers the best hope we have for 
getting policemen consistently to obey and enforce constitutional 
norms that guarantee the liberty of the citizen" because rules made by 
the police are most likely to be obeyed by the police and, when not 
obeyed, are most likely to be effectively enforced by the department. 57 
II. IMPOUNDMENTS AND INVENTORIES: THE BERTINE 
"STANDARDIZED PROCEDURE" REQUIREMENT 
In a series of cases culminating in Colorado v. Bertine, 58 the 
Supreme Court has evaluated the reasonableness under the fourth 
amendment of various police activities related to the impoundment or 
56. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 421. 
57. Id. at 423-28. 
58. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). 
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inventory of effects. In the first case, the Court declined to rely upon a 
police regulation that did exist;59 in the second, the Court relied upon 
a regulation that actually did not exist;60 but finally, in South Dakota 
v. Opperman, 61 the Court appeared to rely somewhat upon a regula-
tion that did exist. Defendant's car was towed to a city impound lot 
after it received two overtime parking tickets while parked at the same 
location over seven hours. An officer then inventoried the contents of 
the car, discovering marijuana in the unlocked glove compartment. 
The Court found the police conduct constitutional. Citing the two 
earlier cases in support of the proposition that "this Court has consist-
ently sustained police intrusions into automobiles impounded or other-
wise in lawful police custody where the process is aimed at securing or 
protecting the car and its contents,"62 the Court in Opperman upheld 
the inventory as such a reasonable intrusion. But the Court intimated 
that the existence of appropriate police regulations on the subject 
might be a sine qua non. The Opperman plurality opinion put fonvard 
the proposition "that inventories pursuant to standard police proce-
dures are reasonable,"63 and Justice Powell, concurring separately, 
stressed that the inventory "was conducted strictly in accord with the 
regulations of the Vermillion Police Department."64 
59. At issue in Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968), was the admissibility of the 
robbery victim's vehicle registration card, found while an officer was securing defendant's im· 
pounded car after it had been inventoried pursuant to a regulation of the D.C. police department. 
By relying upon the district judge's findings "that the discovery of the card was not the result of a 
search of the car, but of a measure taken to protect the car while it was in police custody," 390 
U.S. at 236, the Court managed to avoid expressing any judgment about the police regulation or 
its bearing on the legality of police action pursuant to the regulation. 
60. In Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433 (1973), after defendant crashed his vehicle into a 
bridge abutment, police in that small Wisconsin community had the disabled car towed to a 
private garage and then took defendant, who was drunk and incoherent, to a hospital. The local 
police, believing that the defendant, a Chicago policeman, was required to carry his service re· 
volver at all times, then went to the garage and searched the car parked outside for the weapon 
and found evidence of a homicide. The Supreme Court, in rejecting the court of appeals' conclu-
sion that it was an unreasonable search, emphasized both the searching officer's "specific motiva-
tion and the fact that the procedure he followed was 'standard.'" 413 U.S. at 443. The 
motivation, "to protect the public from the possibility that a revolver would fall into untrained or 
perhaps malicious hands," was deemed by the Court "as immediate and constitutionally reason-
able as" that in Harris. 413 U.S. at 443, 447. The Court repeatedly stressed the officer's suppres· 
sion hearing testimony that the effort to find the revolver was " 'standard procedure in our 
department'," 413 U.S. at 437, but it was never explained precisely how this entered into the 
fourth amendment equation. Nor was the standard procedure ever specifically stated or any 
actual police regulation ever identified. The Court simply "assumed that the small Wisconsin 
police department had an administrative policy on vehicle inventorying. In fact, no such policy 
existed." F. REMINGTON, D. NEWMAN, E. KIMBALL, H. GOLDSTEIN & w. DICKEY, supra note 
32, at 152. 
61. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
62. 428 U.S. at 373. 
63. 428 U.S. at 372. 
64. 428 U.S. at 380 (Powell, J., concurring). In footnote 6, Justice Powell elaborated that 
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Opperman was relied upon in Illinois v. Lafayette, 65 where the 
Court upheld a stationhouse inventory of defendant's effects following 
his arrest for disorderly conduct. Emphasizing an officer had testified 
"it was standard procedure to inventory 'everything' in the possession 
of an arrested person," the Court held "that it is not 'unreasonable' for 
police, as part of the routine procedure incident to incarcerating an 
arrested person, to search any container or article in his possession, in 
accordance with established inventory procedures."66 Significantly, 
Lafayette suggests that rulemaking at the police level is better suited 
for dealing with certain fourth amendment activities of law enforce-
ment officers. The Court cautioned that "it is not our function to 
write a manual on administering routine, neutral procedures of the 
station house," and that the Justices were "hardly in a position to sec-
ond-guess police departments as to what practical administrative 
method will best deter theft by and false claims against its employees 
and preserve the security of the station house. "67 These comments 
responded to the lower court's assertion that a less intrusive policy (for 
example, placing defendant's bag in a sealed locker) would suffice. 
Then came Bertine where, after defendant's arrest for driving 
under the influence, his van was inventoried prior to being towed to an 
impoundment lot, resulting in the discovery of drugs in a backpack 
found lying behind the back seat. The Court emphasized that in the 
present case, "as in Opperman and Lafayette, ... the police ... were 
following standardized procedures,"68 and then proceeded to declare, 
much more clearly than had the Court's earlier decisions, the central 
place of police rulemaking in the constitutional scheme: "We con-
clude that ... reasonable police regulations relating to inventory pro-
cedures administered in good faith satisfy the Fourth Amendment, 
even though courts might as a matter of hindsight be able to devise 
equally reasonable rules requiring a different procedure."69 In re-
jecting the state court's conclusion that Bertine's fourth amendment 
rights had been violated, the Court noted that both the impoundment 
of Bertine's car and the opening of containers found in the car during 
the inventory conformed with Boulder Police Department regulations. 
To the extent that Bertine either encourages or compels police de-
under these regulations all impounded vehicles are inventoried and the inventories always extend 
to the glove compartment. 
65. 462 U.S. 640 (1983). 
66. 462 U.S. at 642, 648. 
67. 462 U.S. at 647, 648. 
68. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372. (1987). 
69. 479 U.S. at 374. 
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partments to engage in the promulgation of guidelines on the subjects 
of impoundment and inventory of vehicles and other effects, it should 
be applauded. Especially because (as Bertine notes) "an inventory 
search may be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment even though 
it is not conducted pursuant to a warrant based upon probable 
cause,"70 some significant protection in lieu of the two traditional 
fourth amendment safeguards of probable cause and warrant is essen-
tial. As Justice Powell emphasized in his Opperman concurrence, to 
protect against "arbitrary invasions by government officials" it is es-
sential that "no significant discretion is placed in the hands of the indi-
vidual officer" concerning "the subject of the search or its scope."71 
Thus, it is not sufficient that the challenged impoundment or inven-
tory is of the kind undertaken by police departments generally,72 nor is 
it sufficient that it conforms to the particular officer's standard prac-
tice. 73 What is necessary, says Bertine, is that this officer was "follow-
ing standardized procedures," which certainly can be most 
convincingly proved by showing that the officer's actions conform to 
"the established policy or procedures of the particular law enforce-
ment agency."74 
Police rulemaking on this subject also permits more meaningful 
input of police expertise. Given that what is at issue here is a "routine 
practice"75 which, as Bertine says, serves "to protect an owner's prop-
erty while it is in the custody of the police, to insure against claims of 
lost, stolen, or vandalized property, and to guard the police from dan-
ger,"76 it is appropriate to expect the police agency in the first instance 
to make a judgment about exactly what kind of routine is needed to 
70. 479 U.S. at 371. 
71. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 377, 384 (1976) (Powell, J., concurring). 
72. As stated in United States v. Hellman, 556 F.2d 442, 444 (9th Cir. 1977): 
The fact that other police departments routinely follow such a practice may give support to 
the proposition that such a practice, iflocally followed, is reasonable. It does not, however, 
render reasonable a search where the inventorying practice is not locally followed and the 
search, thus, is a departure from local practice. A locally followed practice gives some 
assurance that a particular car was not singled out for special searching attention. 
73. As stated in People v. Long, 419 Mich. 636, 647, 359 N.W.2d 194, 199 (1984) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 467, 320 N.W.2d 866, 875 (1982) (Moody, J., 
concurring)): 
Although the officer testified as to his personal "standard" procedure, this procedure does 
not meet the requirements of reasonableness as suggested in Opperman. A standard depart-
mental practice gives some assurance that the particular vehicle or part of the vehicle was 
not singled out for a search based upon an improper motive. Without a departmental pol-
icy, too much discretion is placed in the hands of a police officer. His decision to search may 
be an arbitrary one. 
74. State v. Atkinson, 298 Or. 1, 10, 688 P.2d 832, 837 (1984). 
75. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976). 
76. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987). 
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serve those governmental interests in that particular locality. The re-
sult is not state-wide uniformity (as likely would be the case if the 
matter were left entirely to the courts), but this is all to the good; 
"different procedures might be appropriate for various circumstances 
in different communities throughout the state."77 Moreover, if the 
process begins with policymaking by law enforcement agencies, then 
the courts can perform a more appropriate role. As one state supreme 
court put it: · 
It is not our function to decide as a matter of policy how, and for what 
purpose, automobiles or other private property that come into official 
custody should be examined. That is a matter for politically accountable 
officials to decide by laws, ordinances, or delegations of rulemaking au-
thority. Our role ... is to assure that such policies and procedures as are 
adopted do not violate constitutional guarantees. 78 
In the years prior to Bertine, lower courts took varied positions 
concerning the existence or nonexistence of police department regula-
tions on the subject of impoundment and inventory. At one extreme 
was the view that "the fact such a search is made pursuant to a police 
regulation should have no bearing in determining whether the search 
is reasonable";79 at the other was the notion that to be lawful an inven-
tory "must be made pursuant to established police regulations."80 Be-
tween these extremes were cases in which regulations were not 
mandated but, because they did exist and were placed in evidence, 
were used to determine the lawfulness of the police conduct. That is, 
the legality of the challenged impoundment or inventory was deter-
mined by whether the police conformed with81 or deviated from82 
those regulations. Bertine certainly rejects the first extreme, and 
rightly so, but it is by no means apparent that the Supreme Court has 
opted for the second extreme, which would require that "standardized 
procedures" be established only by policies set out in writing in a po-
lice manual or standard operating procedure. In the recent case of 
United States v. Frank, 83 the Third Circuit upheld an inventory that 
77. Atkinson, 298 Or. at 6-7, 688 P.2d at 835, noting that state-wide uniformity imposed by 
appellate courts might well be grounded in some mistaken assumptions. "For instance, a re-
quirement that police attempt to contact the owner of each impounded vehicle before undertak-
ing an inventory might presuppose that all law enforcement agencies have a uniform capability 
that may or may not exist." 298 Or. at 7, 688 P.2d at 835. 
78. Atkinson, 298 Or. at 6, 688 P.2d at 835. 
79. United States v. Lawson, 487 F.2d 468, 476 (8th Cir. 1973). 
80. State v. Ruffino, 94 N.M. 500, 502, 612 P.2d 1311, 1313 (1980). 
81. E.g., United States v. Bosby, 675 F.2d 1174 (11th Cir. 1982); People v. Trusty, 183 Colo. 
291, 516 P.2d 423 (1973). 
82. E.g., State v. Vernon, 45 N.C. App. 486, 263 S.E.2d 340 (1980); State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 
264 (Utah 1985). 
83. 864 F.2d 992 (3d Cir. 1989). 
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conformed to "unwritten standard procedures" testified to by a police 
lieutenant, though the department in question "had no written proce-
dures governing inventory searches."84 The Frank court declared: 
"No Supreme Court case has ever held an inventory search invalid 
because of the absence of formalized pre-existing standards."85 
This latter statement is unquestionably true, 86 and in defense of 
Frank it might be asserted that Bertine does not even contain specific 
dictum suggesting that if the procedures there had not been in writing 
the result might be different. But, while Frank may in that sense be 
"correct," it is doubtful that the conclusion reached there is a desira-
ble one. In support of Frank, it might be argued that an inventory 
should be upheld when, as in Madison v. United States, 87 although the 
police department did "not have written guidelines for such searches, 
the officer testified that he had been trained by his supervisors to per-
form inventory searches in this manner and he did so in accordance 
with standard operating procedures."88 But once it is accepted that 
the Bertine "standardized procedures" can be established by police tes-
timony about current practices rather than by proof of preexisting 
written policies, there are dangers aplenty. As United States v. Ly-
ons 89 said of such a situation: "It is far from clear that this sort of 
vague, customary departmental 'policy' would satisfy the concerns ex-
pressed by the Court in Opperman. " 90 A primary concern, of course, 
is the possibility of undetected arbitrariness, a risk which takes on 
much greater proportions when the supposed "standardized proce-
dures" are established only by the self-serving and perhaps inaccurate 
oral statements of a police officer, and are not memorialized in the 
department's previous written instructions to its officers. Another 
concern, as reflected by the Lyons use of the word "customary," is that 
what is represented as department policy may constitute nothing more 
than a custom, hardly deserving the deference which an actual policy 
84. 864 F.2d at 1002. 
85. 864 F.2d at 1003. 
86. It is still true after Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990), for the Supreme Court 
there held inventory of a suitcase found in a DWI arrestee's impounded car violated the fourth 
amendment, given the state court's finding "that the Florida Highway Patrol had no policy 
whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encountered during an inventory 
search." 
87. 512 A.2d 279 (D.C. 1986). 
88. 512 A.2d at 281. 
89. 706 F.2d 321 (D.C. Cir. 1983). 
90. 706 F.2d at 334 n.22; see also People v. Dandrea, 736 P.2d 1211, 1212 n.3, 1218 n.14 
(Colo. 1987) (where three officers testified about a certain department policy but "[n]o actual 
police department manuals or directives were introduced into evidence," court need not decide 
what "weight might be accorded such policy," as "no such policy was established in this case"). 
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receives pursuant to Bertine. One might hope, therefore, that other 
courts will come to emulate the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial 
Court, which recently held that the state constitution "requires the 
exclusion of evidence seized during an inventory search not conducted 
pursuant to standard police procedures, which procedures, from now 
on, must be in writing."91 
Although Bertine itself does not explicitly go this far, the Supreme 
Court's opinion strongly encourages departments to adopt written pol-
icies. Given that Bertine does require "standardized procedures," a 
matter on which the prosecution bears the burden of proof,92 it bene-
fits the police to have these procedures actually set out in a manual or 
similar directive. This seems particularly apparent when one consid-
ers another aspect of Bertine not yet mentioned: as lower courts have 
rather consistently concluded,93 a majority of the Supreme Court 
deems it "permissible for police officers to open closed containers in an 
inventory search only if they are following standard police procedures 
that mandate the opening of such containers in every impounded vehi-
cle. "94 Establishing this kind of absolute, nondiscretionary policy is 
likely to be especially difficult absent evidence in the form of written 
policies. 95 
The positive side of Bertine, then, is this encouragement of police 
rulemaking concerning what the Court has sometimes called the 
91. Commonwealth v. Bishop, 402 Mass. 449, 451, 523 N.E.2d 779, 780 (1988). 
92. United States v. Judge, 846 F.2d 274 (5th Cir. 1988). 
93. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 764 P.2d 530, 533 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Harmon v. State, 
748 P.2d 992, 994 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 426 (Utah App. 
1988). 
94. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1987). This language is from the three-Justice 
concurrence. The two dissenters surely would settle for nothing less. The position of the remain-
ing four members of the Court is unclear, although they joined the opinion of the Court in which 
some emphasis was placed upon the fact that "the Police Department's procedures mandated the 
opening of closed containers and the listing of their contents." 479 U.S. 374 n.6. 
In the post-Bertine case of Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 1635 (1990), there appears this 
contrary statement: "A police officer may be allowed sufficient latitude to determine whether a 
particular container should or should not be opened in light of the nature of the search and 
characteristics of the container itself." But this language is only dictum; the Court in Wells held 
that the challenged container inventory violated the fourth amendment because the inventorying 
police agency "had no policy whatever with respect to the opening of closed containers encoun-
tered during an inventory search." 110 S. Ct. at 1635. The language first quoted was strongly 
objected to by four members of the Court. Justices Brennan and Marshall, concurring, inter-
preted Bertine as "premised on the city's inventory policy that left no discretion to individual 
officers as to the opening of containers," 110 S. Ct. at 1639; Justice Blackmun, whose opinion 
Justice Stevens agreed with, noted there was "no reason for the Court to say anything about 
precisely how much, if any, discretion an individual policeman constitutionally may exercise," 
110 S. Ct. at 1639 (emphasis in original). 
95. See Johnson, 764 P.2d at 533, and Harmon, 748 P.2d at 992, where such proof was 
presented. Cf. State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 427 (Utah App. 1988) (though search of closed 
containers is consistent with the purposes of inventory, such search held invalid here because 
Utah Highway Patrol order "is silent on y.rhether closed containers should be opened"). 
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"community caretaking functions" of the police,96 an area in which 
both the availability of law enforcement expertise and the need to re-
strict discretion makes such administrative action especially appropri-
ate. But Bertine has a negative side as well, and it concerns judicial 
evaluation of relevant police regulations. While these regulations are 
entitled to some deference from the courts, there are limits. "Obvi-
ously, a policy of deferring to administrative regulations could have 
undesirable consequences, if the deference were carried too far: con-
stitutional protections would be at the mercy of the most intrusively 
imaginative police chief or jail administrator."97 And that is why the 
Court cautiously stated in Bertine that it was only "reasonable" police 
regulations which satisfied the fourth amendment. 
In Bertine, the defendant argued "that the inventory search of his 
van was unconstitutional because departmental regulations gave the 
police officers discretion to choose between impounding his van and 
parking and locking it in a public parking place."98 Before noting and 
assessing the Court's response to that contention, it is important first 
to emphasize the significance of the issue raised. The defendant fo-
cused attention upon the police rule regarding impoundment rather 
than inventory, but this lessens not one iota the necessary judicial con-
cern, as a fourth amendment matter, with the reasonableness of the 
challenged regulation. The essential point is that the "legal validity of 
the inventory depends upon the lawfulness of the underlying impound-
ment"99 or other form of police custody.100 "Obviously, there is no 
need to perform the caretaking function of an inventory when the ve-
hicle is not in the care, custody, and control of the police."101 And 
this means there is an equivalent need for a discretion-limiting rule 
applicable to both police decisions - whether to take custody of the 
vehicle, and then whether to inventory it (or, in fourth amendment 
terms, whether to "seize" and whether to "search"). A regime that 
has very specific rules governing when an impounded vehicle may be 
96. Cady v. Dombrowksi, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973). 
97. State v. Ridderbush, 71 Or. App. 418, 425, 692 P.2d 667, 672 (1984). 
98. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). 
99. State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428, 431 (Iowa 1984) (citing many cases from other 
jurisdictions). 
100. Noting that in South Dakota v. Opperman the Supreme Court discussed the lawfulness 
of inventory of "automobiles impounded or otherwise in lawful police custody," 428 U.S. 364, 
373 (1976), the court in State v. Stalder, 231 Neb. 896, 899-900, 438 N.W.2d 498, 501 (1989), 
decided that a formal impoundment was not an inevitable prerequisite to inventory. 
101. Caplan v. State, 531 So. 2d 88, 90 (Fla. 1988) (holding, consequently, that there was no 
police right of inventory when the defendant merely asked the assistance of the police in sum-
moning a tow truck for his disabled vehicle, for the car was not "impounded or otherwise placed 
in police control"). 
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inventoried but permits officers substantial discretion concerning 
whether to impound in the first place is just as threatening to fourth 
amendment values as a regime that carefully circumscribes the im-
poundment decision but leaves the police broad latitude regarding 
which impounded cars will be inventoried. 
In response to the defendant's contention in Bertine, the opinion of 
the Court states: 
Nothing in Opperman or Lafayette prohibits the exercise of police discre-
tion so long as that discretion is exercised according to standard criteria 
and on the basis of something other than suspicion of evidence of crimi-
nal activity. Here, the discretion afforded the Boulder police was exer-
cised in light of standardized criteria, related to the feasibility and 
appropriateness of parking and locking a vehicle rather than impounding 
it. There was no showing that the police chose to impound Bertine's van 
in order to investigat~ suspected criminal activity.102 
This is a most inadequate response which, unfortunately, fails to rec-
ognize the precise function that reviewing courts must perform in a 
system which relies upon police rulemaking to contribute meaning-
fully to the protection of fourth amendment rights. 
For one thing, the passage quoted above fails even to recognize 
why police regulations providing "standardized procedures" are im-
portant in such areas of fourth amendment activity as impoundment 
and inventory. Their purpose in the fourth amendment scheme of 
things, as Justice Powell succinctly put it in his Opperman concur-
rence, is "to safeguard the privacy and security of individuals against 
arbitrary invasions by government officials."103 "Arbitrary" action is 
that "depending on choice or discretion" and "arising from unre-
strained exercise of the will, caprice, or personal preference,"104 and 
thus is hardly limited to those situations where (in the language of 
Bertine) the police acted on "suspicion of evidence of criminal activ-
ity." That is simply a matter of motivation, but it is the fact of devia-
tion from established practice or the erratic action due to the 
nonexistence of an established practice that is an appropriate object of 
fourth amendment concern. If my car is impounded when others' are 
merely parked, if my car is inventoried when others' are merely se-
cured, or if the containers in my car are.opened in inventorying when 
others' are not, then - absent good reason for singling me out - my 
privacy and security have been improperly intruded upon whether it is 
suspicion of criminal activity or any of a myriad of other reasons 
which accounts for my different treatment. 
102. 479 U.S. at 375-76 (footnote omitted). 
103. 428 U.S. at 377. 
104. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 110 (1981). 
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Moreover, the Bertine palliative that there "was no showing that 
the police chose to impound Bertine's van in order to investigate sus-
pected criminal activity" likewise misrepresents the function of police 
rulemaking. It makes Bertine appear as a case in which the issue was 
simply whether the defendant had proved he had been the victim of a 
pretext or subterfuge search - one purported to be for one reason but 
in fact motivated by another. But, as I explain later, 105 proving police 
motivation is a most difficult and seldom successful undertaking, and 
consequently it is a rather precarious device upon which to hang 
fourth amendment rights. Although arbitrariness can occur for a vari-
ety of reasons, the nature of police responsibilities makes especially 
acute both the risk that supposedly routine noninvestigative activities 
will be commenced only because of an investigative purpose and the 
risk that this motivation will never be exposed to the light of day. 
That is precisely why discretion-limiting police regulations are needed 
regarding impoundment and inventory: to restrict severely the oppor-
tunities for undetected (and perhaps undetectable) subterfuge to influ-
ence search and seizure decisions. Thus, the Court in Bertine should 
not have said, in effect, that the defendant's failure to prove an investi-
gative purpose made unnecessary any assessment of the breadth and 
precision of the applicable police regulations. Rather, the Court 
should have asked whether those regulations sufficiently confined po-
lice discretion so as to provide reasonable assurance against seizures 
and searches undertaken for reasons unknown to the victims of these 
intrusions and unknowable to the courts. 106 Only the dissenters in 
Bertine appreciated this point.101 
105. See infra note 258 and accompanying text. 
106. As one court applying Bertine noted, judicial efforts to discern police motivations are 
bound to fail, as "our human limitations do not allow us to peer into a police officer's 'heart of 
hearts.' " United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1147 n.5 (5th Cir. 1989). 
107. Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, cogently noted: 
In both Opperman and Lafayette, the Court relied on the absence of police discretion in 
determining that the inventory searches in question were reasonable .... In assessing the 
reasonableness of searches conducted in limited situations such as these, where we do not 
require probable cause or a warrant, we have consistently emphasized the need for such set 
procedures: "standardless and unconstrained discretion is the evil the Court has discerned 
when in previous cases it has insisted that the discretion of the official in the field be circum-
scribed, at least to some extent." ... 
Inventory searches are not subject to the warrant requirement because they are con-
ducted by the government as part of "community caretaking" function, "totally divorced 
from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence relating to the violation of a 
criminal statute." Standardized procedures are necessary to ensure that this narrow excep-
tion is not improperly used to justify, after the fact, a warrantless investigative foray. Ac-
cordingly, to invalidate a search that is conducted without established procedures, it is not 
necessary to establish that the police actually acted in bad faith, or that the inventory was in 
fact a "pretext." By allowing the police unfettered discretion, Boulder's discretionary 
scheme, like the random spot checks in Delaware v. Prouse, is unreasonable because of the 
"grave danger" of abuse of discretion. 
Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 377-78, 381 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting) (quoting 
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Given the Court's erroneous frame of reference in Bertine, it is by 
no means surprising that the challenged Boulder police regulation 
which passed muster in that case falls significantly short of performing 
its fourth amendment function of limiting police discretion. As the 
two dissenters point out, this police directive (never quoted by the ma-
jority) states the police may tum the car over to a third party, park it 
in a nearby public parking lot and merely lock it, or impound and 
inventory. And, as the dissenters further emphasized, the officer in 
this case testified that decisions regarding these alternatives "were left 
to the discretion of the officer on the scene."108 To thjs, the Bertine 
majority lamely responds that the regulations ~·establish[ ] several con-
ditions that must be met before an officer may pursue the park and 
lock altemative,"109 thus ignoring that the limitations so stated confine 
not at all the individual officer's power to opt for the impoundment-
inventory alternative. 
It is possible, and certainly most desirable, to give deference to po-
lice regulations - as in Bertine, to acknowledge that such a regulation 
is not unreasonable merely because "courts might as a matter of hind-
sight be able to devise equally reasonable rules requiring a different 
procedure"110 - yet also to require that those regulations impose real-
istic limits on police discretion. The point is not that the regulations 
must totally eliminate discretion, for that is impossible. "[A]s a prac-
tical matter, the exercise of some discretion by agents, even if only 
interpretive, is inevitable since no manual can reasonably be expected 
to spell out in detail the correct action in light of the almost infinite 
array of objects an agent may encounter."lll Thus, even under the 
Bertine concurrence's rule that "it is permissible for police officers to 
open closed containers in an inventory search only if they are follow-
ing standard police procedures that mandate the opening of such con-
tainers in every impounded vehicle,"112 a carefully drawn police 
regulation will inevitably require officers sometimes to decide, for ex-
ample, "whether an object constitutes a 'container.' "113 
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 661 (1979); Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)) 
(citations omitted). Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979), is discussed infra in the text ac-
companying note 163. 
108. 479 U.S. at 381 (Marshall and Brennan, JJ., dissenting). 
109. 479 U.S. at 376 n.7. 
110. 479 U.S. at 374. 
111. United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir. 1989). 
112. 479 U.S. at 376-77. 
113. United States v. Judge, 864 F.2d 1144, 1145 (5th Cir .. 1989), where the court also 
commented: 
The determination of what constitutes a container is inherently discretionary. Suppose, 
for instance, that an agent finds a shaving kit inside a car. If the agent concludes that the 
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Rather, the question is whether or not the challenged police regu-
lations impose realistic limits on discretion. As the Bertine Court 
highlighted by reaffirming Lafayette's refusal to adopt an "alternative 
'less intrusive' means" test, one way to limit discretion is by not even 
trying to draw lines which, in practice, might be misinterpreted; in-
stead, discretion could be limited by requiring the same police re-
spo11:se to a broad category of cases. This is exactly the focus of the 
Bertine concurrence: it might be possible to draft and defend a more 
selective rule than that of requiring police to open all closed containers 
in all impounded vehicles, 114 but the virtue of the broader policy is 
that it "promotes a certain equality of treatment. With a standard-
ized, mandatory procedure, the minister's picnic basket and grandma's 
knitting bag are opened and inventoried right along with the biker's 
tool box and the gypsy's satchel."115 Also, a rule of this broader type 
may often by its very nature provide us with some assurance that the 
policymaking police officials carefully balanced the competing inter-
ests. As "the cost of law enforcement is more widely distributed, ... 
there is less reason to fear that the governmental decisions to trade off 
privacy for law enforcement are being made without considering 
everyone's interests equally."116 And thus we are more likely to ac-
cept the police conclusion that the various objectives of the inventory 
process can be achieved only by looking inside closed containers when 
we find that they even intend to look in "the minister's picnic basket 
and grandma's knitting bag." 
It thus appears that an impoundment rule of the broader type, ig-
shaving kit is a container, he is bound to open it and inventory its contents. However, if the 
agent determines for some reason that the kit is not a container, he may not open it, and 
must list it on the inventory sheet as merely a "shaving kit." Suppose, though, that our 
hypothetical DEA agent decided that the kit was a container and proceeded to open it, 
discovering inside among other articles a can of shaving cream and a tube of toothpaste. Is 
the can of shaving cream a container subject to being opened for an inventory? What about 
the tube of toothpaste? It all depends on the meaning the DEA agent accords to the word 
"container," which involves an exercise of discretion. 
114. Especially if the somewhat narrower rule did not confer unnecessary discretion. In the 
Wells case, discussed in supra note 94, Justice Blackmun opined that under Bertine a state could, 
for example, "adopt a policy which requires the opening of all containers that are not locked," 
see, e.g., Johnson v. State, 764 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Harmon v. State, 748 P.2d 992 
(Okla. Crim. App. 1988), but yet strongly criticized the majority's "language, unnecessary on the 
facts of this case, concerning the extent to which a policeman, under the Fourth Amendment, 
may be given discretion in conducting an inventory search." Florida v. Wells, 110 S. Ct. 1632, 
1638-39 (1990). 
115. State v. Shamblin, 763 P.2d 425, 428 {Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
116. Wasserstrom & Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 71 GEO. 
L.J. 19, 95 (1988). As Justice Jackson, concurring in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 336 
U.S. 106, 112-13 (1949), put it, "nothing opens the door to arbitrary action so effectively ns to 
allow [municipal] officials to pick and choose only a few to whom they will apply legislation and 
thus to escape the political retribution that might be visited upon them if larger numbers were 
affected." 
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noring the tum-over-to-friend and park-at-scene alternatives, is a per-
missible police regulation. This is not to suggest, however, that a 
police rule cannot be unreasonable because of excessive breadth. Cer-
tainly "a general policy that at any time when there is a felony arrest 
the vehicle was to be seized," even when the arrestee was not in or by 
the vehicle and even when "the vehicle was parked at the defendant's 
residence, at a motel or restaurant parking lot, or at some other place 
indicating little need for impoundment for safekeeping purposes,"117 is 
vulnerable. Nor does this suggest that responsible policymaking at the 
police level will not sometimes result in the drafting of narrower rules 
or those requiring decisionmaking by officers on the scene. An im-
poundment rule might well deal with the tum-over-to-friend and park-
at-scene alternatives. As recent cases discussing and upholding such 
provisions make apparent, 118 rules can be drafted so that - unlike the 
Boulder regulation in Bertine - police are advised about those cir-
cumstances in which they must forgo resort to the impooodment 
alternative. 
Of course, even if the regul~tion sufficiently reduces the need for 
discretion in the field, the rule must draw sensible distinctions. One 
would expect courts to be more likely to second-guess the police 
rulemakers when it appears, for example, that the impoundment alter-
native is mandated for a group less likely to be aple to influence politi-
cally the making or revision of rules. This explains State v. Crosby, 119 
invalidating a regulation permitting only family members to take pos-
session of arrestees' vehicles. The court explained: 
In a university community, particularly where an arrest is made near the 
university, such a policy is certainly suspect in that it imposes a burden 
on out of town students who have no family members available. Thus 
the suspicion is raised that the policy is intended only as subterfuge for a 
warrantless search without probable cause.120 · 
III. INSPECTIONS: THE CAMARA "REASONABLE .•• 
ADMINISTRATIVE STANDARDS" REQUIREMENT 
In Camara v. Municipal Court, 121 the Court held that city officials 
ordinarily must obtain a search warrant to conduct an unconsented 
housing inspection. In reaching this conclusion, the majority empha-
117. State v. Kuster, 353 N.W.2d 428, 432 (Iowa 1984). 
118. E.g., Johnson v. State, 764 P.2d 530 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988); Harmon v. State, 748 
P.2d 992 (Okla. Crim. App. 1988). 
119. 403 So. 2d 1217 (La. 1981). 
120. 403 So. 2d at 1220. 
121. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
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sized that the fourth amendment interests involved were more than 
"peripheral," that the protections of the warrant process would ensure 
that householders were not left "subject to the discretion of the official 
in the field," and that there was no basis for concluding that "the bur-
den of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental pur-
pose behind the search."122 But, while Camara required that absent a 
genuine emergency a search warrant be obtained for a housing inspec-
tion, this turned out to be a very special kind of warrant. 
Camara marks the origin of a most important fourth amendment 
doctrine - the so-called balancing test under which certain discrete 
investigative and enforcement practices constituting "searches" or 
"seizures" are permitted upon less than the traditional quantum of 
probable cause. By "balancing the need to search against the invasion 
which the search entails,"123 the Court in Camara held that housing 
' inspection warrants did not require probable cause in the sense in 
which that phrase previously had been used in the fourth amendment 
lexicon. Rejecting the appellant's claim that an inspection is constitu-
tionally permissible only "when the inspector possesses probable cause 
to believe that a particular dwelling contains violations of the mini-
mum standards prescribed by the code being enforced,"124 the Court 
held that reasonable standards based upon such factors as the passage 
of time, the nature of the building, and the condition of the entire area 
would suffice. Thus, concluded the Court, probable cause for a war-
rant exists in this special context "if reasonable legislative or adminis-
trative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with 
respect to a particular dwelling."12s 
The business inspection counterpart of Camara is Marshall v. Bar-
low's, Inc., 126 which involved the constitutionality of a broad warrant-
less inspection provision of the Occupational Safety and Health 
Act. 127 Because the Court was "unconvinced ... that requiring war-
122. 387 U.S. at 530, 532, 533. 
123. 387 U.S. at 537. 
124. 387 U.S. at 534. 
125. 387 U.S. at 538. 
126. 436 U.S. 307 (1978). 
127. This provision permitted inspectors, without a warrant, 
(1) to enter without delay and at reasonable times any factory, plant, establishment, 
construction site, or other area, workplace or environment where work is performed by an 
employee of an employer; and 
(2) to inspect and investigate during regular working hours and at other reasonable 
times, and within reasonable limits and in a reasonable manner, any such place of employ-
ment and· all pertinent conditions, structures, machines, apparatus, devices, equipment, and 
materials therein, and to question privately any such employer, owner, operator, agent, or 
employee. 
29 U.S.C. § 657(a) (1990). 
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rants to inspect will impose serious burdens on the inspection system 
or the courts,"128 it held the warrantless inspection provision violated 
:the fourth amendment. As for the grounds to obtain the requisite 
business inspection warrant, the majority in Barlow's followed the 
Camara approach: 
A warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an 
OSHA search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the en-
forcement of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, 
dispersion of employees in various types of industries across a given area, 
and the desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the 
area, would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights.129 
It may appear at first blush that all this is only remotely relevant to 
the more particularized focus of this article, police rules and policies. 
After all, Camara and Barlow's were concerned with inspections not 
by police but by housing and OSHA inspectors, respectively. But, as 
the Supreme Court more recently held in New York v. Burger, 130 the 
special body of fourth amendment law that has developed on the sub-
ject of inspections applies even when police are called upon to do the 
inspecting and when more traditional law enforcement concerns ac-
count in part for the inspection program.13 1 
Camara and Barlow's are striking examples of the Supreme Court's 
recognition of how a regime of administrative plus judicial decision-
making, drawing upon the special advantages of each, can contribute 
to both the protection of fourth amendment rights and the advance-
ment of legitimate government interests. As a closer look at the 
Camara-Barlow's warrant scheme demonstrates, the Court's system of 
promulgation of "administrative standards" and judicial review of 
contemplated application of those standards, permits the full use of 
expertise at the enforcement level. It also affords considerable assur-
ance against abuse of discretion by those planning and conducting 
inspections. 
Housing inspection programs have traditionally involved adminis-
128. 436 U.S. at 316. 
129. 436 U.S. at 321. 
130. 482 U.S. 691 (1987). 
131. Burger involved a statutory inspection scheme for automobile dismantlers. The state 
court had decided that the "fundamental defect in the statutes before us is that they authorize 
searches undertaken solely to uncover evidence of criminality and not to enforce a comprehen-
sive regulatory scheme." People v. Burger, 67 N.Y.2d 338, 344, 493 N.E.2d 926, 929, 502 
N.Y.S.2d 702, 705 (1986). The Supreme Court disagreed, reasoning "that a State can address a 
major social problem [e.g., auto theft] both by way of an administrative scheme and through 
penal sanctions." New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712 (1987). As for the fact that police 
were used to conduct the inspections, the court held this did not make any difference either, as 
"many States do not have the resources to assign the enforcement of a particular administrative 
scheme to a specialized agency." 482 U.S. at 717. 
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trative decisionmaking. Administrators have selected properties for 
inspection when there are insufficient personnel to conduct a periodic 
inspection of all designated buildings, and have adjusted the period 
between inspections according to different rates of neighborhood dete-
rioration.132 Camara obviously recognizes the need for such discre-
tion in the first instance in a sensibly administered inspection system. 
But, are these decisions now to be reviewed by the magistrate? Is he to 
determine the wisdom of once-a-year inspections throughout the com-
munity? Is the magistrate to pass upon the soundness of a particular 
neighborhood inspection plan? Although it frequently has been as-
serted that a judicial officer is not in a position to perform such a func-
tion, 133 the responsibilities of the magistrate here are not made 
absolutely clear in Camara. In the branch of the opinion dealing with 
the grounds for an inspection warrant, the Court says that the special 
type of probable cause needed for inspections exists "if reasonable leg-
islative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection 
are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling."134 This strongly 
suggests that the judicial officer has two responsibilities: (1) a general 
determination of the reasonableness of the inspection program; and (2) 
a specific determination of whether the particular inspection requested 
fits within that program. Yet, in the part of Camara imposing the 
search warrant requirement, the Court seems to assume that judicial 
review of the grounds for inspection will occur "without any reassess-
ment of the basic agency decision to canvass an area."135 Post-
Camara appellate litigation about housing inspections is sufficiently 
rare that no statement can be made about how courts generally believe 
this ambiguity in Camara should be resolved, although at least some 
authority supports the conclusion that the magistrate should deter-
mine whether the administrative program is itself "reasonable."136 
The Camara requirement that the warrant-issuing judicial officer 
must determine that the requested inspection falls within existing leg-
islative or administrative standards is intended as a check upon arbi-
trary searches. It responds to the Camara majority's stated concern 
that a warrantless inspection system would "leave the occupant sub-
ject to the discretion of the official in the field" 137-that, as some of 
132. Note, Enforcement of Municipal Housing Codes, 18 HARV. L. REV. 801, 807 (1965). 
133. Comment, Administrative Inspections and the Fourth Amendment - A Rationale, 65 
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 291 (1965); Recent Cases, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 265, 276 (1959). 
134. Camara v. Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523, 538 (1967). 
135. 387 U.S. at 532. 
136. City of Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 627 P.2d 159 (1981). 
137. 387 U.S. at 532. 
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the justices put it earlier, inspections may otherwise be "based on ca-
price or.on personal or political spite"138 or be conducted "only [as] a 
front for the police .... " 139 Once again the scarcity of post-Camara 
appellate litigation does not permit a general statement as to precisely 
how or how effectively this has worked out. It does seem clear, how-
ever, as at least one court has insisted, that for this function of the 
warrant process to be performed the magistrate must be given details 
about the nature of the inspection program under which the warrant is 
being sought, for only then can the magistrate determine whether "the 
desired inspection fits within that program."140 Had the Camara ma-
jority made that point more clearly, they would have blunted the dis-
senters' objection that the majority's scheme contemplated nothing 
more than "warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing 
magistrate."141 
Barlow's, the business inspection case, seems to clarify that the 
warrant-issuing magistrate is to perform the two functions mentioned 
above. The Barlow's holding, again, was that a 
warrant showing that a specific business has been chosen for an OSHA 
search on the basis of a general administrative plan for the enforcement 
of the Act derived from neutral sources such as, for example, dispersion 
of employees in various types of industries across a given area, and the 
desired frequency of searches in any of the lesser divisions of the area, 
would protect an employer's Fourth Amendment rights.142 
Such a warrant, the Court added, "would provide assurances from a 
neutral officer that the inspection is reasonable under the Constitution, 
is authorized by statute, and is pursuant to an administrative plan con-
taining specific neutral criteria."143 The determination of "neutral cri-
teria" requires some review of the plan itself, while the "pursuant to" 
limitation requires a judicial determination that the contemplated in-
spection falls within that plan. 
If the benefits of the Barlow's warrant system are to be realized, 
there must exist a fairly specific legislative or administrative plan 
against which to judge the individual inspection contemplated. The 
point is illustrated by State ex rel. Accident Prevention Division of 
138. Ohio ex rel Eaton v. Price, 364 U.S. 263, 271 (1960). 
139. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 242 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
140. City of Seattle v. Leach, 29 Wash. App. 81, 84, 627 P.2d 159, 162 (1981) (quoting In re 
Northwest Airlines, Inc., 587 F.2d 12, 14-15 (7th Cir. 1978)); see also 29 Wash. App. at 85, 627 
P.2d at 162 (holding insufficient a warrant issued on the basis of an affidavit which merely as-
serted that the intended inspection was part of "a regular building inspection which is conducted 
for all buildings"). 
141. See v. City of Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 548 (Clark, J., dissenting). 
142. Marshall v. Barlow's, Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 321 (1978). 
143. 436 U.S. at 323. 
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Workmen's Compensation Board v. Foster, 144 where a warrant was is-
sued upon a showing that the inspection was "routine" and that the 
premises in question had not been inspected for a certain period of 
time. The applicable statute said that "cause shall be deemed to exist 
if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting a 
routine, periodic or area inspection are satisfied with respect to the 
particular place of employment." The court found the statute unob-
jectionable but nonetheless held the warrant invalid because no stan-
dards had been promulgated indicating "the manner of selection of the 
premises to be searched."145 Unfortunately, not all appellate courts 
are true to the spirit of Barlow's in this respect.146 
Even more unfortunate is that in practice, the potential for protect-
. ing the fourth amendment rights of b~sinesses through a process of 
judicially reviewed administrative regulation has been largely unreal-
ized because of another development and its curious ramifications. 
The development concerns the question of when a business inspection 
is constitutional absent a warrant. In this area, as in other branches of 
fourth amendment law, truly exigent circumstances arise in which it 
would make no sense to insist that a warrant be obtained prior to the 
search. But in the business inspection field there has been a tendency 
to overstate what circumstances are in fact "exigent." Donovan v. 
Dewey 147 is illustrative. Starting with the congressional finding that 
safety hazards in mines can be concealed easily, the Court took this to 
mean that "unannounced, even frequent, inspections" were necessary, 
which in turn led the Court to the conclusion that therefore a warrant 
requirement would "frustrate inspection."148 But if, as the Court ear-
lier noted in Barlow's, a need for frequent inspections does not mean 
frequent search warrant applications, because most businessmen will 
cooperate and permit the inspection when the inspector first appears 
sans warrant, then it is still not apparent that a warrant requirement, 
limited to the few cases in which the inspector is turned away, would 
"frustrate" the program. And as for those few, the asserted need for 
"unannounced" inspections cannot be taken seriously given that the 
legislative scheme builds delay and notice requirements into the in-
144. 31 Or. App. 291, 570 P.2d 398 (1977). 
145. 31 Or. App. at 298, 570 P.2d at 401. 
146. See, e.g., United States v. Voorhies, 663 F.2d 30 (6th Cir. 1981) (although legislation 
itself did not provide specific guidelines and defined probable cause only as "a valid public inter-
est in the effective enforcement of this subchapter," and despite no showing of an administrative 
plan as to how to proceed, warrant application deemed sufficient because it said the particular 
premises had not been searched before). 
147. 452 U.S. 594 (1981). 
148. 452 U.S. at 603. 
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spection process.149 Cases such as Dewey are troublesome because it 
appears that the actual feasibility of obtaining a warrant has little or 
nothing to do with whether a fourth amendment warrant requirement 
is recognized. 
As exemplified by other areas of fourth amendment law,150 the 
· grounds-for-search requirement ought not somehow vanish simultane-
ously with the warrant requirement. Thus the absence of a business 
inspection warrant requirement does not diminish the need for a 
grounds-for-search standard, for it is still important that the inspector 
have a basis for assessing what it is the inspector may do, and that a 
magistrate in a suppression hearing have a basis on which to judge the 
lawfulness of the inspection. But this logical proposition finds little 
support in the Supreme Court's warrantless inspection cases. 
Although the Court in Dewey does not expressly state that the fact 
"unannounced, even frequent, inspections are essential" also fore-
Closes inquiry into why the inspector chose this business on this occa-
sion, the implication is that it does, for the Court insists it is not 
dealing with an inspection scheme that (as in Barlow's) confers "al-
most unbridled discretion" 151 upon the inspectors. But in fact, the 
statutory scheme upheld in Dewey does not impose any limits on mine 
inspectors regarding when or how often any particular mine will be 
inspected, 152 and thus there remains a need for an administrative plan. 
This is equally true of Burger, holding warrantless inspections con-
ducted by police lawful because the "statute informs the operator of a 
vehicle dismantling business that inspections will be made on a regular 
149. The Act forbids use of force when entry is refused and instead requires that the Secre-
tary of Labor in such instance go to court and seek an injunction against future refusal. Thus, in 
Dewey the legislative determination of "the notorious ease with which many safety or health 
hazards may be concealed," S. REP. No. 181, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1977), reprinted in 1977 
U.S. CODE CoNG. & ADMIN. NEWS 3401, 3427, cannot be taken to mean that Congress decided 
that any delay or advance notice of inspections would undercut the Act's objectives, as the Act 
itself requires delay and notice (i.e., resort to injunction proceedings) whenever a mine owner 
turns the inspector away. That is, the factor relied upon in Barlow's to support the conclusion 
that there was no need for unconsented warrantless inspections is now relied upon in Dewey as a 
reason for upholding a warrantless inspection scheme. 
150. Illustrative is the doctrine of California v. Camey, 471 U.S. 386 (1985), which generally 
permits the search of vehicles without a search warrant, but changes not at all the requirement 
that such searches for evidence of crime be made upon the traditional quantum of probable 
cause. 
151. 452 U.S. at 601, 603. 
152. The statute, 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (1988), requires inspection of all surface mines at least 
twice annually, and all underground mines at least four times annually. It can hardly be said, as 
the Court claims in Dewey, that "the Act ..• specifically defines the frequency of inspection," 452 
U.S. at 603-04, as it merely sets a lower limit, and in practice the frequency might substantially 
exceed the minimum. See, e.g., Youghiogheny & Ohio Coal Co. v. Morton, 364 F. Supp. 45, 47 
(S.D. Ohio 1973) (three mines visited on 465 of 715 work days during two-year period). 
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basis."153 The truth of the matter, however, as the three dissenters 
pointed out, is this: 
Neither the statute, nor any regulations, nor any regulatory body, pro-
vides limits or guidance on the selection of vehicle dismantlers for in-
spection. In fact the State could not explain why Burger's operation was 
selected for inspection. . . . This is precisely what was objectionable 
about the inspection scheme [in Barlow~]: It failed to "provide any stan-
dards to guide inspectors either in their selection of establishments to be 
searched or in the exercise of their authority to search."154 
Because the no-warrant holding has typically been grounded in the 
need for "unannounced, even frequent, inspections," perhaps the ma-
jority in cases like Dewey and Burger assume that in such circum-
stances the Barlow's neutral plan approach simply does not apply. So 
the argument might go, if the inspection scheme requires "frequent" 
inspections at the businesses covered, then there is already such a per-
vasive degree of scrutiny and control that it is unnecessary to impose a 
limitation intended merely as a check against arbitrary selection or 
concentration. But surely this is not so. For example, even accepting 
the correctness of the holding in Dewey that no warrant is ever re-
quired for a mine safety inspection, it hardly follows that a particular 
mine operator may be subjected to, say, ten times as many inspections 
as his competitors without the government at any point being required 
to justify this degree of attention. The Supreme Court needs to say so 
and, in the process, to restore law enforcement policymaking to its 
rightful place in federal, state and local inspection activities. 
IV. STOPS: BY "PLAN" OR BY "PROFILE" 
Among the landmarks in fourth amendment jurisprudence is the 
"stop-and-frisk" case of Terry v. Ohio. 155 Prior to Terry, courts were 
inclined to take a monolithic view of the fourth amendment, classify-
ing and treating all seizures of the person in exactly the same way. 
Such acts were "arrests," and consequently could be made only upon 
the traditional quantum of probable cause. But in Terry the Court 
utilized the Camara balancing test to support the conclusion that a 
brief detention on the street for investigation is much less intrusive 
than a full-fledged stationhouse arrest and consequently is sometimes 
permissible even absent grounds to make an arrest. From Terry 
emerged the new issue of what facts and circumstances would justify a 
153. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 711 (1987). 
154. 482 U.S. at 723 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (quoting Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 601 
(1981)). 
155. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
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brief detention on the street. Terry also recognized that what it called 
"street encounters" constituted a low visibility activity utilized for a 
variety of purposes and readily subject to abuse, including "wliolesale 
harassment [of minorities] by certain elements of the police commu-
nity .... " 156 The case therefore gave rise to special "concern over the 
need to structure the officer's exercise of discretion,"157 which quite 
naturally leads to the question of whether courts have perceived police 
guidelines as being essential or useful to the task of determining when 
a Terry stop is permissible. 
Terry itself contains no hints about the apposition of police rules 
and policies to the just-emerging doctrine; indeed, the Court said very 
little about the standard governing brief street detentions other than 
that their "limitations will have to be developed in the concrete factual 
circumstances of individual cases."158 But in later cases, the Court 
recognized that such a stop might be found lawful on either of two 
different bases: (1) an individualized suspicion basis, as reflected in the 
Court's declaration in United States v. Cortez 159 that an "assessment 
. . . based upon all the circumstances, . . . seen and weighed . . . as 
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement ... , must 
raise a suspicion that the particular individual being stopped is en-
gaged in wrongdoing";160 and (2) a standardized procedures basis, as 
reflected in the assertion of a unanimous Court in Brown v. Texas 161 
that a brief detention for investigation could "be carried out pursuant 
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitations on the conduct of 
individual officers."162 This "plan" alternative is reminiscent of the 
"standard procedures" and "administrative standards" approaches 
previously discussed, and consequently I will examine it first. 
Although the Court in Brown did not elaborate on its dictum, an 
insight into what the Court apparently was alluding to is revealed by 
the earlier decision in Delaware v. Prouse. 163 The Court there was con-
cerned with a so-called "routine" stopping of a vehicle to check its 
registration and the operator's driver's license, done without a reason-
able suspicion the car was being operated in violation of law and not 
"pursuant to any standards, guidelines, or procedures pertaining to 
156. 392 U.S. at 14. 
157. Mertens, The Fourth Amendment and the Control of Police Discretion, 17 U. MICH. J.L. 
REF. 551, 594 (1984). 
158. 392 U.S. at 29. 
159. 449 U.S. 411 (1981). 
160. 449 U.S. at 418. 
161. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
162. 443 U.S. at 51. 
163. 440 U.S. 648 (1979). 
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document spot checks .... " 164 Rejecting the State's argument that its 
"interest in discretionary spot checks as a means of ensuring the safety 
of its roadways outweighs the resulting intrusion on the privacy and 
security of the persons detained," the Court held that individual stops 
were permissible only upon individualized reasonable suspicion, that 
is, if "there is at least articulable and reasonable suspicion that a mo-
torist is unlicensed or that an automobile is not registered .... " 165 
But of relevance here is the Court's final comment: 
This holding does not preclude the State of Delaware or other States 
from developing methods for spot checks that involve less intrusion or 
that do not involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion. Questioning 
of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops is one possible alternative. 
We hold only that persons in automobiles on public roadways may not 
for that reason alone have their travel and privacy interfered with at the 
unbridled discretion of police officers. 166 
This statement provoked a "sarcastic rejoinder" 167 from Justice 
Rehnquist, the lone dissenter. He objected that the Court, in finding 
that "motorists, apparently like sheep, are much less likely to be 
'frightened' or 'annoyed' when stopped en masse," had "elevate[d] the 
adage 'misery loves company' to a novel role in Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence."168 But the majority in Prouse is correct. For one 
thing, under the Camara balancing-of-interests formula, there is a gen-
uine difference in degree-of-intrusion terms between an individual stop 
and a roadblock stop. As the Court recognized in another case up-
holding checkpoint operations conducted to discover illegal aliens: 
"At traffic checkpoints the motorist can see that other vehicles are 
being stopped, he can see visible signs of the officers' authority, and he 
is much less likely to be frightened or annoyed by the intrusion."169 
For another, random stops without reasonable suspicion are different 
as a constitutional matter precisely because they do not safeguard citi-
zens against "indiscriminate official interference."17° Finally, the dis-
tinction drawn by the Prouse majority makes sense in terms of 
representative reinforcement, which "[i]n the context of the fourth 
164. 440 U.S. at 650. 
165. 440 U.S. at 655, 663. 
166. 440 U.S. at 663. Two concurring Justices "assume[ed] that the Court's reservation also 
includes other not purely random stops (such as every tenth car to pass a given point) that equate 
with, but are less intrusive than, a 100% roadblock stop." 440 U.S. at 664 (Blackmun and 
Powell, JJ., concurring). 
167. Mertens, supra note 157, at 556. 
168. 440 U.S. at 664. 
169. United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558 (1976) (quoting United States v. 
Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 894-95 (1975)). 
170. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 883 (1975). 
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amendment [means] that the tradeoff between privacy and law en-
forcement produced by our political institutions should stand, pro-
vided that everyone's interests are equally represented in the making 
of these political decisions." 171 If it is thus true that the police can be 
afforded greater leeway "when the privacy costs of law enforcement 
are spread more widely, and there is a reduced risk that the politically 
less powerful are being forced to bear disproportionate privacy 
losses,"172 then we have 
a plausible rationale for the Court's decision [in Prouse]. We should be 
worried that the police on patrol will disproportionately stop the young, 
the black, and the poor for suspicionless license checks. Those with 
more political clout will be spared the indignity and inconvenience of 
these checks. By requiring that the police use full roadblocks, the cost of 
law enforcement is more widely distributed, and there is less reason to 
fear that the governmental decisions to trade off privacy for law enforce-
ment are being made without considering everyone's interests equally.173 
These reasons supporting the Prouse roadblock thesis also lend 
support to the notion that police regulations concerning roadblocks 
should be encouraged if not mandated by the courts. Law enforce-
ment guidelines regarding when, where and how roadblocks are to be 
conducted can serve to ensure that the roadblocks are as unthreaten-
ing as possible, that unnecessary discretion has not been left to officers 
on the scene, and that a considered judgment was made by departmen-
tal policymakers about exactly how much of an intrusion upon the 
public at large is feasible - including in a political sense - in the 
interest of law enforcement. In. its truncated discussion of roadblocks 
in Prouse, the Court unfortunately said nothing about whether law 
enforcement guidelines were necessary or desirable in the conducting 
of roadblocks. But the Court significantly distinguished the random 
stop conduct in Prouse from that attending the alien-check roadblock 
earlier approved by the Court in United States v. Martinez-Fuerte. 114 
That case does make some exceedingly important observations about 
the significance of law enforcement policies relating to roadblock oper-
ations. Specifically, the Court in Martinez-Fuerte (1) stressed that, 
with regard to the type of roadblocks upheld by the Court, the "loca-
tion of a fixed checkpoint is not chosen by officers in the field, but by 
officials responsible for making overall decisions as to the most effec-
tive allocation of limited enforcement resources"; (2) emphasized that 
"deference is to be given to the administrative decisions of higher 
171. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 116, at 93. 
172. Id. at 95. 
173. Id. 
174. 428 U.S. 543 (1976). 
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ranking officials"; and (3) cautioned that those decisions are nonethe-
less "subject to post-stop judicial review."175 Moreover, lower courts 
increasingly are taking positions that make it most advantageous for 
the police to engage in careful rulemaking concerning driver's license/ 
auto registration checkpoints. Some of the decisions place great em-
phasis upon the existence of and compliance with discretion-limiting 
directives from supervisory officials, intimating that such guidelines 
are essential,176 while others at least express a preference for a system 
of "written policy and supervision."177 
The Supreme Court addressed the roadblock issue more directly in 
Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 178 upholding the Department's 
sobriety checkpoint program under which "checkpoints are selected 
pursuant to . . . guidelines, and uniformed police officers stop every 
approaching vehicle."179 In rejecting the state court's conclusion that 
the checkpoint program was unconstitutional under the Brown v. 
Texas 180 balancing test because it failed the "effectiveness" part of that 
test, the Court stated: 
The actual language from Brown v. Texas, upon which the Michigan 
courts based their evaluation of "effectiveness," describes the balancing 
factor as "the degree to which the seizure advances the public interest." 
This passage from Brown was not meant to transfer from politically ac-
175. 428 U.S. at 559, 566. The Court in Martinez-Fuerte proceeded to review the administra-
tive decision to place an alien checkpoint at San Clemente and found that the "location meets the 
criteria prescribed by the Border Patrol to assure effectiveness.'' 428 U.S. at 562 n.15. 
176. E.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (1980) (emphasizing that as a 
result of Prouse the prosecutor urged each police department to adopt rules and procedures on 
roadblocks; that the chief in this town did adopt them; that they limited discretion by, e.g., 
establishing a precise formula as to the pattern of stops - "every 5th car during light traffic 
hours" - at roadblocks; and that the police at the scene did in fact follow these "specific, defined 
standards in stopping motorists"); State v. Shankle, 58 Or. App. 134, 647 P.2d 959 (1982) 
(stressing that the Oregon State Police Policy Manual included factors on how to locate the 
checkpoint and how to conduct it, including what pattern of stops to utilize, so that "the proce-
dures to be applied by the police officers were explicitly set out in their policy manual"). 
177. For example, State v. Cloukey, 486 A.2d 143, 147 (Me. 1985), which, however, rejected 
defendant's argument that the roadblock was unconstitutional because "there was no decision 
made by policy making supervisory officers either as to the necessity for and reasonableness of 
the road block, or to the procedures to be used in setting up the road block.'' 486 A.2d at 146. 
Compare State v. Marchand, 104 Wash. 2d 434, 706 P.2d 225 (1985), expressing "doubt 
whether an internal directive of a law enforcement agency can overcome constitutional defects in 
a statute.'' The statute in Marchand permitted random stops, while the State Patrol's written 
procedures mandated stopping and inspection "in groups of vehicles without discrimination.'' 
But, this policy was not as carefully drafted as those approved in other cases and, as far as the 
court could tell, "they may be overridden by local supervising officers, and •.• individual officers 
may decide to implement them at any time or place without supervisory authority," and thus the 
court ultimately concluded "that the State Patrol procedural policy offers exactly the kind of 
unconstrained and unfettered discretion that Prouse condemns.'' 104 Wash. 2d at 440-41, 706 
P.2d at 228. 
178. 110 S. Ct. 2481 (1990). 
179. 110 S. Ct. at 2487. 
180. 443 U.S. 47 (1979). 
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countable officials to the courts the decision as to which among reason-
able alternative law enforcement techniques should be employed to deal 
with a serious public danger. Experts in police science might disagree 
over which of several methods of apprehending drunken drivers is pref-
erable as an ideal. But for purposes of Fourth Amendment analysis, the 
choice among such reasonable alternatives remains with the governmen-
tal officials who have a unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, 
limited public resources, including a finite number of police officers.181 
This passage from Sitz may be read as encouraging policymaking 
at the police level, for it reflects a disinclination by the Court to sec-
ond-guess certain kinds oflaw enforcement decisions. It also explains, 
or at least intimates, what kinds of law enforcement policies are most 
likely to receive such deference. For one thing, the Court indicates 
that the challenged practice arose out of a 9ecision concerning how 
best to utilize "limited public resources," a kind of police decision that 
presumably ought to receive considerable respect. For another, the 
Court emphasizes the propriety of leaving the decision to employ so-
briety checkpoints with "politically accountable officials." That 
squares with the previously discussed concept of representative rein-
forcement: the decision was, in effect, a decision to enforce the DWI 
laws by placing a burden on the motoring public at large, and conse-
quently it is the kind of law enforcement decision for which the polit-
ical process presumably affords an effective check. 
Viewed more broadly, however, Sitz is rather disappointing. It 
does not reflect a commitment by the Court either to take full account 
of relevant police guidelines or to submit those guidelines to meaning-
ful judicial review. The necessity for doing either is virtually assumed 
out of existence by the slight-of-hand manifested in the Sitz excerpt set 
forth above. By asserting that the case involves nothing more than a 
decision belonging entirely to the police to choose from among what 
are conclusively characterized as "reasonable alternative law enforce-
ment techniques,"182 the Court finds it unnecessary to assay or even 
articulate all the considerations that entered into the law enforcement 
judgment that checkpoints constitute a "reasonable alternative." That 
judgment, if made within the framework of Brown v. Texas, would be 
that the benefits of the contemplated practice outweigh its 
intrusiveness. 
But, just how intrusive a roadblock is depends, as noted earlier, 
upon the safeguards attending its operation - those which minimize 
the effect of the seizures upon motorists and those which eliminate the 
181. 110 S. Ct. at 2487. 
182. 110 S. Ct. at 2487. 
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risk of arbitrary action by those operating the checkpoint, as reflected 
in applicable police guidelines.183 Were there guidelines in Sitz? Yes; 
as the Court noted, an advisory committee "comprising representa-
tives of the State Police force, local police forces, state prosecutors, 
and the University of Michigan Transportation Research Institute ... 
created guidelines setting forth procedures governing checkpoint oper-
ations, site selection, and publicity."184 However, the Sitz majority 
deemed it unnecessary to reveal in what manner those guidelines mini-
mized the intrusiveness of the checkpoint operation, except to note the 
extremely important requirement that "[a]ll vehicles passing through a 
checkpoint would be stopped."18s 
This disinterest in the existing guidelines in Sitz contrasts sharply 
with many of the earlier lower court decisions regarding sobriety 
checkpoints. In those decisions, courts generally accepted that these 
roadblocks must be "established by [a] plan formulated or approved 
by executive-level officers of the law enforcement agencies involved" 
which contains "standards ... with regard to time, place" and similar 
matters.186 This, the courts explain, is necessary because "[i]n the ab-
sence of record evidence that the decision to establish the roadblock 
was made by anyone other than the officers in the field, the roadblock 
in question [has] certain characteristics of a roving patrol,"187 namely, 
an appreciable risk of an arbitrary basis for the site or time decision. 
Thus, a failure to have these decisions made by supervisory officials 
has been a factor stressed by courts in holding a particular sobriety 
checkpoint illegal, 188 while other cases upholding these roadblocks 
183. Pre-Sitz cases in the lower courts properly concluded that such a roadblock is illegal if 
the officers at the scene are operating "without specific directions or guidelines." State ex rel. 
Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. l, 5, 663 P.2d 992, 996 (1983); see also State v. Jones, 483 So. 
2d 433, 438 (Fla. 1986) ("[l]t is essential that a written set of uniform guidelines be issued before 
a roadblock can be utilized."); Nelson v. Lane County, 304 Or. 97, 111, 743 P.2d 692, 700 (1987) 
(stressing "supervising officer relied on a manual setting forth procedures for the roadblocks"). 
This is because it is essential that the "officers in the field [have] no discretion to pick and choose 
who would or would not be stopped." State v. Deskins, 234 Kan. 529, 542, 673 P.2d 1174, 11&5 
(1983) (upholding the sobriety checkpoint at issue there because it did not involve such discre-
tion); see also People v. Bartley, 109 III. 2d 273, 289-90, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985) (stressing 
that vehicles were "stopped in a preestablished, systematic fashion" pursuant to existing "guide-
lines on the operation of the roadblock"); and compare Commonwealth v. McGeoghegan, 389 
Mass. 137, 144, 449 N.E.2d 349, 353 (1983) (checkpoint violated fourth amendment where "the 
officers used their own discretion in deciding which cars to stop"); Webb v. State, 739 S.W.2d 
802, 810 (Tex. Crim. App. 1987) (checkpoint operation illegal, as "absolutely no evidence of 
formal, neutral guidelines formulated by superior law enforcement officials"). 
184. 110 S. Ct. at 2484. 
185. 110 S. Ct. at 2484. 
186. State ex rel Ekstrom v. Justice Court, 136 Ariz. 1, 9, 663 P.2d 992, 1000 (1983) (Feld-
man, J., concurring). 
187. State v. Olgaard, 248 N.W.2d 392, 394-95 (S.D. 1976). 
188. E.g., State v. Crom, 222 Neb. 273, 277, 383 N.W.2d 461, 463 (1986) (fact that "there 
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have placed considerable emphasis upon the fact that a high-level plan 
determined where and when the roadblocks would be operated.189 
Lower courts have also focused upon the presence or absence of other 
established procedures, such as those providing notice by advance 
publicity19° or at the checkpoint scene.191 
As for the perceived benefits underlying the decision by Michigan 
law enforcement authorities to utilize sobriety checkpoints, the opin-
ion of the Sitz majority is again wanting. True, the Court says "empir-
ical data" supports the checkpoints' efficiency and then points to trial 
testimony "that experience in other States demonstrates that, on the 
whole, sobriety checkpoints resulted in drunken driving arrests of 
around 1 percent of all motorists stopped."192 To this, the three dis-
senters cogently respond (i) that "there is absolutely no evidence that 
this figure represents an increase over the number of arrests that 
would have been made by using the same law enforcement resources in 
conventional patrols";193 and (ii) that in any event the benefit articu-
lated by law enforcement witnesses at trial was instead deterrence, 
about which no evidence was offered. 194 Obviously, meaningful judi-
cial review of law enforcement policies cannot occur in such 
circumstances. 
Whether Terry stops pursuant to a "plan" rather than on individu-
alized suspicion are permissible in somewhat different situations is un-
clear. In Brown v. Texas, 195 where the Supreme Court asserted that 
either individualized suspicion or "a plan embodying explicit, neutral 
limitations on the conduct of individual officers" was required by the 
fourth amendment, the invalidated stop was of a pedestrian whom two 
was no plan formulated at the policymaking level of the Omaha Police Department" was fatal to 
program's constitutionality); Commonwealth v. Amaral, 398 Mass. 98, 100, 495 N.E.2d 276, 278 
(1986) (mere fact captain in state police set up the roadblock not a sufficient showing; need to 
show he used "carefully established standards and neutral criteria" in determining "the time and 
location of roadblocks"). 
189. E.g., People v. Bartley, 109 Ill. 2d 273, 289, 486 N.E.2d 880, 887 (1985) (stressing that 
"[t]he potential for arbitrary enforcement is reduced when the decisipn to establish a roadblock is 
made and the site of the roadblock is selected by supervisory-level personnel," as here); Com-
monwealth v. Tarbert, 517 Pa. 277, 293, 535 A.2d 1035, 1043 (1987) ("[T]he very decision to 
hold a drunk-driver roadblock, as well as the decision as to its time and place, should be matters 
reserved for prior administrative approval .... "). 
190. E.g., State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984); Commonwealth v. 
Trumble, 396 Mass. 81, 483 N.E.2d 1102 (1985); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 
S.E.2d 273 (1985). 
191. E.g., State v. Jones, 483 So. 2d 433 (Fla. 1986); State v. Leighton, 551 A.2d 116 (Me. 
1988). 
192. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487-88 (1990). 
193. 110 S. Ct. at 2495 (Stevens, Brennan and Marshall JJ., dissenting). · 
194. 110 S. Ct. at 2495-96 (Stevens, Brennan and Marshall JJ., dissenting). 
195. 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979). 
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policemen on· midday patrol saw walking away from another man in 
an alley in an area with a high incidence of drug traffic. Because the 
Court's "plan" thesis was set out in this context, it raises the question 
whether stops without individualized reasonable suspicion but pursu-
ant to a neutral plan would be lawful when undertaken for more gen-
eralized or more traditional enforcement purposes, where the usual 
practice has been to focus upon particular suspects. That is, if in 
Brown it had been established that the officers stopped the defendant 
pursuant to a police department "plan" to question all pedestrians 
found in the "high drug problem area," would the outcome have been 
different? I doubt it. For one thing, the "high drug problem area" in 
most municipalities would be an area populated by minorities, and 
thus this police policy could not be supported by the previously dis-
cussed representation-reinforcement theory. Put differently, this 
would not be an instance in which a uniform policy had substantially 
reduced the "risk that the politically less powerful are being forced to 
bear disproportionate privacy losses."196 Moreover, this does not 
seem to be the kind of policy that would in fact substantially eliminate 
discretion by officers in the field, for the simple reason that stopping 
all pedestrians would likely be well beyond police capabilities. 
However, if the "plan" could somehow be more carefully and 
tightly formulated, then there would be good reason to look with favor 
upon this kind of law enforcement planning by police agencies. The 
chances of drawing up a suitable plan appear greater if the plan ad-
dresses a somewhat special problem existing at a certain time and 
place. The point is illustrated by State v. Hilleshiem, 197 where two 
officers devised a plan to stop all vehicles entering a certain park after 
dark because of a wave of vandalism, which had caused $8000 worth 
of damage. Though the court cautioned that "[i]n the balancing equa-
tion, stopping motorists for the purposes advanced here might have 
even less public benefit than a stop to check illegal immigration or 
drivers' licenses,"198 suppression of the evidence obtained in a stop 
pursuant to this scheme was ordered only because the plan had not 
been developed at a policymaking level, where presumably this issue 
would have received more careful attention.199 Hilleshiem thus sug-
196. Wasserstrom & Seidman, supra note 116, at 95. 
197. 291 N.W.2d 314 (Iowa 1980). 
198. 291 N.W.2d at 319. 
199. Compare People v. John BB., 56 N.Y.2d 482, 438 N.E.2d 864, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 
1010 (1982), upholding a burglary-investigation stop pursuant to a uniform plan developed and 
implemented by an officer in the field. For criticism of John BB. and approval of Hil/eshiem, see 
Kerr & Feldman, Roving Roadblocks and the Fourth Amendment, 20 CRIM. L. BULL. 124 
(1984). 
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gests, as occasionally has been held,200 that when police administrators 
have been able to identify a rather unique law enforcement problem in 
a discrete location such as a park, a carefully drafted "plan" respond-
ing to that problem might well authorize stops for questioning at that 
location without individualized suspicion. 
Turning now to the other variety of Terry stop, that made upon 
individualized reasonable suspicion, it is necessary to ask once again 
about the actual and potential contribution of police guidelines in ar-
ticulating clear and proper standards of police conduct. At least as an 
abstract matter, it seems that administrative regulations on this subject 
would be helpful. If, as the Supreme Court has emphasized, the requi-
site degree of suspicion depends upon the evidence "as understood by 
those versed in the field of law enforcement,"201 then surely this exper-
tise can be brought to bear not only through the particular experiences 
of individual officers in the field but also by the collective learning of 
the agency as revealed in announced policies. In addition, law en-
forcement regulations on what constitutes reasonable suspicion might 
give appellate courts "full appreciation" of the "overall impact and 
implications" of specific investigative activities and might "govern the 
exercise of discretion" by police, or so argued one judge with respect 
to the common practice of DEA agents.stopping suspected drug couri-
ers at airports. 202 But the experience of courts with the law enforce-
ment guidelines that emerged in that precise area, the so-called "drug 
courier profile," raises profound questions about what can be accom-
plished by rules governing this sort of police activity. 
Profiles are 
an increasingly popular law enforcement tool. Most prominent among 
the profiles in use today are those used to identify hijackers and those 
used to identify persons who smuggle illegal aliens into the country. 
Less prominent are the drug smuggling vessel profile, the stolen car pro-
file, the stolen truck profile, the alimentary-canal smuggler profile, the 
battering parent profile, and the poacher profile. 203 
200. E.g., People v. Meitz, 95 Ill. App. 3d 1033, 420 N.E.2d 1119 (1981). In Meitz, the court 
upheld a stop where 
the police officer was responding to a governmental interest in stopping a rash of auto thefts 
occurring on a particularized parking lot. Prior to instituting the registration check proce-
dure, the police department determined the times in which the thefts were likely to occur 
and the automobiles that were to be the most susceptible. The department then instructed 
its officers to stop all susceptible vehicles leaving the two exits of the parking lots during the 
hours in which the thefts had originally occurred. 
95 Ill. App. 3d at 1037, 420 N.E.2d at 1122. 
201. United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981). 
202. United States v. Vasquez, 612 F.2d 1338, 1350, 1352 (2d Cir. 1979) (Oakes, J., 
dissenting). 
203. Becton, The Drug Courier Profile: ''All Seems Infected That Th' Infected Spy, as All 
Looks Yellow to the Jaundic'd Eye," 65 N.C. L. REv. 417, 423-25 (1987) (footnotes omitted). 
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But in terms of frequency of use by law enforcement officers and fre-
quency of confrontation by appellate courts, none matches the drug 
courier profile. "Between 1976 and 1986 over 140 reported cases in-
volved airport stops by DEA agents based on the 'drug courier pro-
file.' "204 The content of the profile seems not to have always 
remained constant, which is one of the criticisms of it,205 but as most 
commonly confronted in the cases206 the profile consists of seven pri-
mary and four secondary characteristics: 
r. The seven primary characteristics are: (1) arrival from or departure to 
an identified source city; (2) carrying little or no luggage, or large quanti-
ties of empty suitcases; (3) unusual itinerary, such as rapid tum-around 
time for a very lengthy airplane trip; (4) use of an alias; (5) carrying 
unusually large amounts of currency in the many thousands of dollars, 
usually on their person, in briefcases or bags; (6) purchasing airline tick-
ets with a large amount of small denomination currency; and (7) unusual 
nervousness beyond that ordinarily exhibited by passengers. 
The secondary characteristics are: (1) the almost exclusive use of 
public transportation, particularly taxicabs, in departing from the air-
port; (2) immediately making a telephone call after deplaning; (3) leaving 
a false or fictitious call-back telephone number with the airline being 
utilized; and (4) excessively frequent travel to source or <;Iistribution 
cities.201 
The Supreme Court's most recent208 lucubration regarding this 
profile is United States v. Sokolow, 209 holding the police had grounds 
to stop the defendant as a suspected drug courier on the particular 
cluster of characteristics present in that case.210 In marked contrast to 
some of the Supreme Court cases previously discussed, Sokolow does 
not express any deference toward the law enforcement guidelines -
204. Id. at 417. 
205. Smith, J., dissenting in Bothwell v. State, 250 Ga. 573, 588, 300 S.E.2d 126, 137, cert. 
denied, 463 U.S. 1210 (1983), objected that "profile characteristics appear to vary wildly from 
airport to airport and case to case, giving the profile a shifting, chameleon·like quality." 
206. Cloud, Search and Seizure by the Numbers: The Drug Courier Profile and Judicial Re-
view of Investigative Formulas, 65 B.U. L. REV. 843, 871-72 (1985). 
207. United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1039 n.3 (5th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 
910 (1980). 
208. The Court's earlier encounters with the profile occurred in Florida v. Rodriguez, 469 
U.S. 1 (1984); Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491 (1983); and United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544 (1980), which, it is said, have merely "created confusion among the lower courts." Becton, 
supra note 203, at 454. 
209. 109 s. Ct. 1581 (1989). 
210. In Sokolow, 
the agents knew, inter a/ia, that (1) he paid $2100 for two airplane tickets from a roll of $20 
bills; (2) he traveled under a name that did not match the name under which his telephone 
number was listed; (3) his original destination was Miami, a source city for illicit drugs; (4) 
he stayed in Miami for only 48 hours, even though a round-trip flight from Honolulu to 
Miami takes 20 hours; (5) he appeared nervous during his trip; and (6) he checked none of 
his luggage. 
109 S. Ct. at 1583. 
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that is, the drug courier profile - relied upon by the DEA agents. 
Indeed, the Court framed the issue not as whether the profile some-
how counted in the government's favor, but rather as whether the pro-
file counted against the government. No, the majority responded: "A 
court sitting to determine the existence of reasonable suspicion must 
require the agent to articulate the factors leading to that conclusion, 
but the fact that these factors may be set forth in a 'profile' does not 
somehow detract from their evidentiary significance as seen by a 
trained agent."211 But this was not good enough for the two dissent-
ers, Marshall and Brennan. Though on other occasions (for example, 
in Bertine) these two justices had decried the failure of administrative 
regulations to confine police discretion sufficiently, this time their con-
cern was that the profile tended to discourage individual exercise of 
discretion! They objected: 
It is highly significant that the DEA agents stopped Sokolow because he 
matched one of the DEA's "profiles" of a paradigmatic drug courier. 
[A] law enforcement officer's mechanistic application of a formula of 
personal and behavioral traits in deciding whom to detain can only dull 
· the officer's ability and determination to make sensitive and fact-specific 
inferences "in light of his experience," particularly in ambiguous or bor-
derline cases. Reflexive reliance on a profile of drug courier characteris-
tics runs a far greater risk than does ordinary, case-by-case police work, 
of subjecting innocent individuals to unwarranted police harassment and 
detention. 212 
Though at first blush such a judicial assessment of law enforce-
ment policy might strike one as curious at best, on reflection the seem-
ing incongruity vanishes. For one thing, the profile differs 
substantially from the law enforcement guidelines discussed earlier. 
The others occasionally involve factual determinations of a general na-
ture (for example: Is this a sensible location to place an immigration 
checkpoint? Is this a sensible place to put a sobriety checkpoint?), but 
in the main call for what are essentially policy judgments (for example: 
Do we prefer to impound all arrestees' cars, or should some simply be 
left at the scene? With available resources, how often should we in-
spect auto dismantling shops?). The profile, on the other hand, is in-
tended to establish which air travelers are probably drug couriers, 
which is a specific factual determination, that is, one concerning the 
sufficiency of suspicion regarding particular individuals. Before courts 
readily accept that kind of law enforcement guideline, they are cer-
tainly obliged "to require that the government provide satisfactory 
211. 109 S. Ct. at 1587. 
212. 109 S. Ct. at 1588 (Brennan and Marshall, JJ., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
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empirical evidence that the profile is 'valid' and actually 'works.' " 213 
No such showing bas been made, as Professor Cloud highlights in a 
comparison of the drug courier profile and the hijacker profile: 
Unlike the drug courier profile, the hijacker profile was designed sys-
tematically. The Task Force employed social science methodologies to 
develop the profile. After studying known hijackers, the task force com-
piled twenty-five to thirty characteristics in which hijackers differed sig-
nificantly from the air-traveling public. By putting only a few of them 
together they arguably obtained a reliable combination sharply differen-
tiating potential hijackers from non-hijackers. 
Unlike the drug courier profile, the hijacker profile was tested sys-
tematically to measure its validity. These procedures included field tests 
involving several hundred thousand air travelers as well as the historical 
application of the profile to known hijackers. 
The drug courier profile has never been subjected to any comparable 
process of validation. The government has not conducted any system-
atic study to determine whether the drug profile has any predictive valid-
ity. Indeed, the only evidence of its effectiveness has generally been the 
testimony of agents who utilize the profile in the field. This testimony is 
typically deficient because even when agents "were recognized as having 
made stops in a substantial number of past instances where their suspi-
cions proved to be correct [there was no] evidence as to the number of 
instances in which innocent passengers had been subjected by them to 
investigatory stops.'•214 
A second reason the drug courier profile has deservedly not re-
ceived deference from the appellate courts is that the profile fails to 
limit meaningfully the discretion of agents in the field (or, more pre-
cisely, in the airport). For one thing, as the lower court noted in Soko-
low, the profile has a "chameleon-like way of adapting to any 
particular set of observations. " 215 As another court put it, "there is no 
such thing as a single drug courier profile; there are infinite drug cou-
rier profiles. The very notion is protean, not monolithic."216 This is 
why the profiles tell us that it is suspicious to get off an airplane first217 
or last21s or in between,219 and this is also why they are an object of 
ridicule.22° For another thing, the profiles do not predetermine just 
what combination of suspicious factors must exist for a lawful stop, an 
213. Cloud, supra note 206, at 873. 
214. Id. at 874-75 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Place, 660 F.2d 44, 48-49 (2d 
Cir. 1981), ajfd., 462 U.S. 696 (1983)). 
215. 831 F.2d 1413, 1418 (9th Cir. 1987), revd., 109 S. Ct. 1581 (1989). 
216. Grant v. State, 55 Md. App. 1, 6, 461 A.2d 524, 526 (1983). 
217. United States v. Moore, 675 F.2d 802 (6th Cir. 1982). 
218. United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980). 
219. See United States v. Buenanventura-Ariza, 615 F.2d 29 (2d Cir. 1980). 
220. See LaFave, A Fourth Amendment Fantasy: The Last (Heretofore Unpublished) Search 
and Seizure Decision of the Burger Court, 1986 U. ILL. L. REV. 669, 671. 
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especially critical matter given that some of those factors (for example, 
traveling from a source city) "describe a very large category of pre-
sumably innocent travelers."221 Given this latter problem, it appears 
that the lower court's efforts in Sako/ow to distinguish "ongoing crimi-
nal activity factors" (at least one of which would be required in every 
case) from "personal characteristics"222 were a meaningful response to 
such amphibolic law enforcement guidelines, though the court's appli-
cation of this distinction admittedly was not without difficulties.223 
V. ARRESTS: POLICE LIMITS ON FORCE AND CUSTODY 
Of the important decisions a police officer must make, none carries 
potential consequences more serious than the determination whether 
to employ force against a suspect to make an arrest. A mistaken fail-
ure to utilize force may result in escape of the suspected offender and, 
in some instances, subsequent serious harm to others. A mistaken use 
of force, especially ·a firearm, may result in serious injury to or even 
the death of the suspect or bystanders. Moreover, "[p ]olice use of fire-
arms to apprehend suspects often strains community relations or even 
results in serious disturbances."224 No wonder, then, that this subject 
is a matter of special concern to responsible police administrators225 
and that, contrary to the situation at the time of the ABF Survey,226 
police guidelines on the use of force are now very common. 227 These 
guidelines may quite properly impose limitations more stringent than 
those the legislature has adopted. 228 
The absence of an internal police shooting policy or . . . the existence of 
internal shooting policy that merely restates the law, leaves officers only 
221. Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980). 
222. United States v. Sokolow, 831 F.2d 1413, 1419, 1420 (9th Cir. 1987), revd., 109 S. Ct. 
1581 (1989). 
223. The Sokolow majority questioned, for example, whether the lower court's illustrations of 
"ongoing criminal activity" factors, traveling with an alias or taking an evasive path through the 
airport, had "the sort of ironclad significance attributed to them by the Court of Appeals." 109 
S. Ct. at 1586. 
224. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 189. 
225. See Edwards, The Shot in the Back Case: Tennessee v. Garner, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 733 (1986). 
226. See W. LAFAVE, suna note l, at 209 ("Police manuals and instructional materials •.. 
tend to be ambiguous on the use of force in making arrests. Some police manuals make no 
mention of the problem at all."). Similarly, TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 189, com-
ments that "a 1961 survey of Michigan police forces found that 27 out of 49 had no firearms 
policies." 
227. See Fyfe, Tennessee v. Garner: The Issue Not Addressed, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & Soc. 
CHANGE 721, 723 n.10 (1986). 
228. Long Beach Police Officers Assn. v. City of Long Beach, 61 Cal. App. 3d 364, 372, 132 
Cal. Rptr. 348, 352 (1976); Chastain v. Civil Serv. Bd. of Orlando, 327 So. 2d 230 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1976). 
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their own subjective criteria for deciding whether to use deadly force. 
Unfortunately, in these hurried and excited circumstances, an officer's 
best judgments are often not equal to those that could be formulated at 
leisure, and in advance, by top level policy makers with the time to con-
sider more fully the merits and ramifications of various alternative 
actions. 229 
When the Supreme Court had occasion to decide under what cir-
cumstances police may constitutionally resort to deadly force in at-
tempting to make an arrest, the Court made use of law enforcement 
policies in an unusual way. The case was Tennessee v. Garner, 23° a 
wrongful death action brought under the federal civil rights statute. A 
Memphis police officer had shot and killed an unarmed youth fleeing 
from the burglary of an unoccupied house. The officer's actions con-
formed to a state law following the common law rule, which (as the 
Court noted) "allowed the use of whatever force was necessary to ef-
fect the arrest of a fl~ing felon .... "231 The actions also conformed 
to police department policy, which was slightly more restrictive but 
still allowed use of deadly force in cases of burglary. It was not this 
particular police regulation which grabbed the Court's attention, how-
ever, but rather the pattern revealed in the regulations of other depart-
ments across the country: 
Overwhelmingly, these are more restrictive than the common-law 
rule .... A 1974 study reported that the police department regulations in 
a majority of the large cities of the United States allowed the firing of a 
weapon only when a felon presented a threat of death or serious bodily 
harm .... Overall, only 7.5% of departmental and municipal policies 
explicitly permit the use of deadly force against any felon; 86.8% explic-
itly do not. 232 
The Court concluded that this narrower position rather than the com-
mon law rule squared with the fourth amendment. 
In reaching this result, which was urged upon the Supreme Court 
by many police groups,233 the Justices found the police guidelines 
highly relevant in several respects. First, said the Court, "[i]n light of 
the rules adopted by those who must actually administer them, the 
older and fading common law view is a dubious indicium of the consti-
tutionality of the Tennessee statute now before us/'234 This reliance 
229. Fyfe, supra note 227, at 722-23 (footnotes omitted). 
230. 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
231. 471 U.S. at 12. 
232. 471 U.S. at 18-19 (citations omitted). 
233. "The Police Foundation, together with nine national and international Associations of 
Police and Criminal Justice Professionals, plus the Chiefs of Police Associations of two states and 
thirty-one law enforcement chief executives, joined as amici curiae in support of Cleamtee Gar-
ner, the father of the deceased minor." Edwards, supra note 225, at 735. 
234. 471 U.S. at 19 (footnote omitted). 
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upon the police regulations and, in addition, modem statutes on the 
subJect, apparently constituted "an open effort to divine a national 
trend or consensus concerning the common law rule. "235 This is not 
to suggest that "the Court was doing nothing more than acting pru-
dently to cover its political fiank.'' 236 Rather, as one perceptive com-
mentator has noted, 
[T]he Court's concern with current practice is both defensible and sug-
gestive of a process that is quite sophisticated. For if the Court is en-
gaged in the explication of values, it makes very good sense to refer to 
and be guided by the value judgments of other societal decision mak-
ers .... Thus, ... interpretation need not flow from the top down, but 
may come from the bottom up as well. Indeed, this vertical dialogue is 
especially appropriate to a process of constitutional interpretation that 
implicates society's values.237 
Second, the Court utilized the array of police regulations to rebut 
arguments by Tennessee that the Court's restrictive standard was im-
practicable. Asserting that "[w]e would hesitate to declare a police 
practice of long standing 'unreasonable' if doing so would severely 
hamper effective law enforcement,"238 the Court concluded, in effect, 
that widespread existence of the narrower rule in police guidelines 
demonstrated the lack of such adverse effects. Specifically, the Court 
noted there had been "no suggestion that crime has worsehed in any 
way in jurisdictions that have adopted, by legislation or departmental 
policy, rules similar to that announced today."239 As for the conten-
tion that the Court's rule "requires the police to make impossible, 
split-second evaluations of unknowable facts," the Court responded 
that "this claim must be viewed with suspicion in light of the similar 
self-imposed limitations of so many police departments."240 
Whether the unique use of police regulations found in Garner is 
likely to be repeated in future cases is unclear, although I doubt it will 
become a common occurrence. There are probably not that many 
other policy areas in which a consensus will emerge from the police 
regulations as clearly as in Garner. Further, this collective judgment 
about what the police should or should not do is likely to carry the 
weight it did in Garner only when, as there, it tends to demonstrate 
that the police are operating more narrowly than existing law would 
235. Winter, Tennessee v. Gamer and the Democratic Practice of Judicial Review, 14 N.Y.U. 
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 683 (1986). 
236. Id. at 684. 
237. Id. at 684-85. 
238. 471 U.S. at 19. 
239. 471 U.S. at 19. 
240. 471 U.S. at 20. 
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permit. Nevertheless, Garner demonstrates to the police establishment 
that if the "position" of the police on an important issue of constitu-
tional policy is effectively presented to the Court, the Court will con-
sider it. 
While the existence and content of police regulations was very 
much in the forefront in the Garner Court's analysis, quite the oppo-
site was true in two of the Court's other arrest cases: United States v. 
Robinson 241 and its companion, Gustafton v. Florida. 242 In Robinson, 
a District of Columbia police officer arrested defendant for operating a 
motor vehicle after revocation of his operator's permit, searched de-
fendant incident to that arrest, and discovered heroin inside a cigarette 
package in the left breast pocket of defendant's coat. In a footnote, the 
Court observed that a general order of the D.C. Metropolitan Police 
Department mandated custodial arrest for this type of traffic violation 
and that established procedures in the department required a search of 
those arrested; yet the Court then admonished that "[s]uch operating 
procedures are not, of course, determinative of the constitutional is-
sues presented by this case."243 The defendant contended that the ba-
ses for search incident to arrest - to find evidence of the crime for 
which the arrest was made, and to find any weapons the arrestee might 
use to escape - did not exist in this case. The Court responded that it 
disagreed with the "suggestion that there must be litigated in each case 
the issue of whether or not there was present one of the reasons sup-
porting the authority for a search of the person incident to a lawful 
arrest."244 Thus, concluded the Robinson Court, in every "case of a 
lawful custodial arrest a full search of the person is not only an excep-
tion to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment, but is also 
a 'reasonable' search under that Amendment."245 In Gustafton, where 
marijuana cigarettes were found on defendant's person following his 
arrest for not having his operator's license with him while driving, the 
defendant claimed his case was different from Robinson in several re-
spects, including that there were no applicable police regulations re-
quiring the officer to take the defendant into custody or to make a full-
scale body search incident to arrest. The Court summarily dismissed 
that argument with the observation that these differences were not 
"determinative of the constitutional issue."246 
241. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
242. 414 U.S. 260 (1973). 
243. Robinson. 414 U.S. at 223 n.2. 
244. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
245. Robinson, 414 U.S. at 235. 
246. Gustafson, 414 U.S. at 265. 
December 1990] Police Rulemaking 487 
There is good reason to be concerned about the Robinson-Gustaf-
- ) 
son holding that every custodial arrest, even for a minor traffic viola-
tion, permits a full search of the arrestee's person. There is good 
reason to be even more concerned with the Court's later holding in 
New York v. Belton 247 that in every instance in which "a policeman 
has made a lawful custodial arrest of the occupant of an automobile, 
he may, as a contemporaneous incident of that arrest, search the pas-
senger compartment of that automobile."248 In all such instances, as 
the Robinson dissenters emphasized, "there is always the possibility 
that a police officer, lacking probable cause to obtain a search warrant, 
will use a traffic arrest as a pretext to conduct a search. "249 Given that 
"[v]ery few drivers can traverse any appreciable distance without vio-
lating some traffic regulation,"250 this is indeed a frightening possibil-
ity. It is apparent that virtually everyone who ventures out onto the 
public streets and highways (including Supreme Court Justices251) 
may then, with little effort by the police, be placed in a position where 
his or her person at?-d vehicle are subject to search. 
Because of this, the proposition that the fourth amendment should 
be construed to bar custodial arrests for minor violations is an appeal-
ing one. That issue was not considered in the Robinson-Gustafton de-
cisions, although this possibility may underlie Justice Stewart's 
somewhat cryptic comment in his Gustafton concurrence "that a per-
suasive claim might have been made in this case that the custodial 
arrest of the petitioner for a minor traffic offense violated his rights 
under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments."252 But as yet, as 
Justice Stevens has more recently noted, "the Court has not directly 
considered the question .... " 253 It is true that "a persuasive claim" 
can be made that custodial arrest for lesser offenses is unconstitu-
tional; the argument is grounded in two important fourth amendment 
principles discussed earlier - those concerning preventing arbitrary 
exercise of government power, and those that require balancing the 
individual privacy interests and governmental interests regarding cus-
todial arrest. 254 This suggests that if the Court ever does reach this 
247. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
248. 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). 
249. 414 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
250. B. GEORGE, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON EVIDENCE IN CRIMINAL CASES 65 
(1969 ed.). 
251. Rehnquist Is Given Ticket for Speeding, N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1986, at 10, col. 1. 
252. 414 U.S. at 266-67 (Stewart, J., concurring). 
253. Robbins v. California, 453 U.S. 420, 450 n.11 (1981) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
254. See Salken, The General Warrant of the Twentieth Century? A Fourth Amendment Solu-
tion to Unchecked Discretion to Arrest for Traffic Offenses, 62 TEMPLE L. REv. 221, 224 (1989). 
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question, a Garner-style assessment would be in order, in which case 
the extent to which police regulations across the country do require 
use of the citation alternative would be most relevant.255 
Although the Court in Robinson and Gustafton had no occasion to 
consider that broader question, it is unfortunate that the Court did not 
resolve the narrower issue so dramatically posed by the respective 
state of applicable police regulations in those two cases: whether the 
control of police discretion in Robinson and the absence of control in 
Gustafton was the dominant characteristic in the cases - one which 
should have produced different results in the two decisions. Had the 
Court reflected more carefully upon the proper relevance of law en-
forcement guidelines in such cases, it might have realized the inelucta-
ble rationality of this syllogism: "Arbitrary searches and seizures are 
'unreasonable' searches and seizures; ruleless searches and seizures 
practiced at the varying and unguided discretion of thousands of indi-
vidual peace officers are arbitrary searches and seizures; therefore, 
ruleless searches and seizures are 'unreasonable' searches and 
seizures."256 As Professor Amsterdam has put it so eloquently, "[i]f 
the Court had distinguished the two cases on this ground, it would ... 
have made by far the greatest contribution to the jurisprudence of the 
fourth amendment since James Otis argued against the writs of assist-
ance in 1761 and 'the child Independence was born.' " 257 
Perhaps the Court's failure to take this step was grounded in the 
assumption that the risk of arbitrariness in law enforcement may be 
sufficiently overcome by allowing a particular defendant to prove that 
an officer acted from an ulterior motive. But tangible evidence of sub-
jective motivation is difficult for defendants to produce and difficult for 
courts to assess,258 which perhaps explains why Justice White was 
once moved to observe that "sending state and federal courts on an 
expedition into the minds of police officers would produce a grave and 
fruitless misallocation of judicial resources."259 And this may explain 
why the Supreme Court ultimately held that fourth amendment issues 
255. Just what the pattern is here is unclear. Doubt has sometimes been expressed as to 
whether police regulations requiring use of citations in specified circumstances have been 
promulgated. See Salken, supra note 254, at 252-53. But rulemaking on this subject has often 
been urged upon the police. See, e.g., 2 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 10-2.J(b) 
(2d ed. 1980); ALI MODEL CoDE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE§ 120.2(4) (1975). 
256. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 417. 
257. Id. at 416 (footnote omitted). 
258. As one appellate judge commented about Robinson, it is "next to impossible to deter-
mine that in making the arrest the police were motivated by the desire to search for evidence of a 
crime not related to the arrest." State v. Florance, 270 Or. 169, 197, 527 P.2d 1202, 1215 (1974) 
(O'Connell, C.J., dissenting). 
259. Massachusetts v. Painten, 389 U.S. 560, 565 (1968) (White, J., dissenting). 
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should be judicially resolved by use of an objective standard. The de-
cision is Scott v. United States, 260 a wiretapping case in which the de-
fendants' "principal contention" was that the evidence must be 
suppressed because the agents did not make a good faith effort to com-
ply with the minimization requirement. The Court concluded that the 
government's response, that "subjective intent alone ... does not make 
otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional," 
embodies the proper approach for evaluating compliance with the mini-
mization requirement. Although we have not examined this exact ques-
tion at great length in any of our prior opinions, almost without 
exception in evaluating alleged violations of the Fourth Amendment the 
Court has first undertaken an objective assessment of an officer's actions 
in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him .... 
We have since held that the fact that the officer does not have the 
state of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the 
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate the action 
taken as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify that ac-
tion .... The Courts of Appeals which have considered the matter have 
likewise generally followed these principles, first examining the chal-
lenged searches under a standard of objective reasonableness without re-
gard to the underlying intent or motivation of the officers involved.261 
Although it is not clear that the Court in Scott meant to "apply its 
supposed objective test to the issue of pretextual fourth amendment 
activity,"262 applying this test produces the following results: (1) If 
the police arrest X for crime A, as they would have in any event, in the 
anticipation or hope of thereby finding evidence of crime B on X's 
person, the latter "underlying intent or motivation" does not make 
their action illegal. 263 (2) If the police stop X's car for minor offense A, 
and they "subjectively hoped to discover contraband during the stop" 
so as to establish serious offense B, the stop is nonetheless lawful if "a 
reasonable officer would have made the stop in the absence of the inva-
lid purpose."264 (3) If police obtain a search warrant to search X's 
premises for evidence of crime A, which again they would have done 
in any event, the search is not illegal merely because the police suspect 
they might find evidence of crime B. 265 ( 4) If X's car is searched in the 
hope or expectation of finding evidence of crime B, but that search was 
260. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
261. 436 U.S. at 136-38. 
262. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 
363, 367 (1989). 
263. E.g., Home v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 512, 515-17, 339 S.E.2d 186, 188-89 (1986). 
264. E.g., United States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988) (quoting United 
States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986)). 
265. E.g., State v. Riedinger, 374 N.W.2d 866, 876 (N.D. 1985). 
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an inventory which would have been made in any event,266 or a search 
for evidence of crime A which would have been made in any event,267 
again the evidence is admissible. The decisions reaching these conclu-
sions (often by relying on Scott) are sound, for when the action would 
have occurred in any event, there is no conduct which ought to have 
been deterred and thus no reason to bring the exclusionary rule into 
play for purposes of deterrence. 
But some of the allegedly pretextual search and seizure cases are of 
another kind. The driver of an automobile suspected of unlawful di;ug 
activity is placed under custodial arrest for a traffic violation and then 
searched, although the arrest was not "one which would have been 
made by a traffic officer on routine patrol against any citizen driving in 
the same manner."268 A person suspected of drug activity is arrested 
late at night inside the premises of another by state police holding city 
arrest warrants for two minor traffic violations, hardly the usual prac-
tice in dealing with outstanding traffic warrants.269 An arrestee's car 
is impounded and then inventoried "contrary to the usual procedure 
followed in traffic cases."270 Situations such as these involve what the 
Supreme Court has properly characterized as "serious misconduct by 
law-enforcing officers,"271 but this does not mean that the Scott rea-
soning is inapplicable. These and similar fact situations involve "seri-
ous misconduct" in spite of rather than because of the "underlying 
intent or motivation" of the police. That is, the proper basis of con-
cern is not with why the officer deviated from the usual practice but 
simply that he did deviate. It is the fact of the departure from the 
accepted way of handling such cases which makes the officer's conduct 
arbitrary, and it is the arbitrariness which, in this context, constitutes 
the fourth amendment violation. 
As a result, the question of what police ordinarily do in a particu-
lar set of circumstances becomes critical in these so-called pretext 
cases. Illustrative are the facts in United States v. Guzman, 272 where a 
New Mexico state patrolman stopped a car because the driver did not 
have his seat belt fastened; the stop led to other events which uncov-
ered cocaine in the car. The court explained that under the rule stated 
above: 
266. E.g., State v. Rodewald, 376 N.W.2d 416, 422 (Minn. 1985). 
267. State v. Oliver, 341 N.W.2d 744, 745-47 (Iowa 1983). 
268. Diggs v. State, 345 So. 2d 815, 816 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1977). 
269. Harding v. State, 301 So. 2d 513 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
270. State v. Volk, 291 So. 2d 643, 644 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1974). 
271. Abel v. United States, 362 U.S. 217, 226 (1960). 
272. 864 F.2d 1512 (10th Cir. 1988). 
December 1990] Police Rulemaking 491 
If police officers in New Mexico are required to and/or do routinely 
stop most cars they see in which the driver is not wearing his seat belt, 
then this stop was not unconstitutionally pretextual at its inception, even 
if Officer Keene subjectively hoped to discover contraband during the 
stop. Conversely, if officers rarely stop seat belt law violators absent 
some other reason to stop the car, the objective facts involved in this stop 
suggest that the stop would not have been made but for a suspicion that 
coulq not constitutionally justify the stop. 273 
In Guzman no evidence in the record pointed one way or another, as 
the district judge had erroneously decided in defendant's favor on a 
subjective state-of-mind theory. This did not require remand because 
the appellate court found another basis upon which to rule in defen-
dant's favor. But if remand had been necessary, then the district court 
would have had to make a factual determination of whether drivers 
violating the seat belt law are, on the one hand, "rarely" stopped or, 
on the other, "routinely" stopped. In such circumstances, as the refer-
ence in Guzman to when police are "required" to stop such offenders 
suggests, it is exceedingly important that the litigants and the court 
focus on the question of whether or not a police rule on the subject 
exists. Admittedly a court might find a practice "routine" even absent 
such a regulation, but when no applicable law enforcement policy ex-
ists there is reason to be uneasy about applying the Scott approach. 
Lacking such documentation, testimony by individual officers regard-
ing what they perceive as the "routine" in their department carries at 
least some of the risk that made the intent-of-the-officer approach un-
palatable to courts: a significant chance that the truth of the matter 
will not be accurately established by the self-serving declarations of 
the officer whose conduct has been challenged. This suggests that this 
is an area of fourth amendment litigation within which the existence of 
and reliance upon law enforcement regulations takes on special 
importance. 
Some courts have given Scott a quite different interpretation, with 
the unfortunate result that pretext contentions are being dismissed 
even when it is shown (perhaps by noncompliance with an existing 
police regulation) that the established "routine" was not followed. 274 
273. 864 F.2d at 1518 (citation omitted). 
274. Typical of this approach are these three cases, all involving pretext arrest claims and all 
relying heavily on Scott: United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179, 1181, 1186-87 (5th Cir. 1987) 
(police, suspecting defendant but lacking grounds to arrest him for robbery, learned of outstand-
ing warrant for defendant's arrest because of his failure to appear in court to answer petty theft 
charge; because the police "took no action that they were not legally authorized to take," defen-
dant's pretext claim rejected notwithstanding the facts; as stressed by. the dissenters, that this 
warrant was "seven and a half years old, issued for failure to appear in city court to answer to a 
charge that itself could no longer be prosecuted because the statute of limitations had run," and 
that the "police never had a practice of following up on such warrants, and in foraging through 
old records in search of a warrant against Causey they were not following any established pol-
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These decisions interpret the Scott "objective assessment" test as, in 
effect, eliminating any meaningful way of mounting a pretext claim, 
for they treat as irrelevant both what evidence may exist regarding the 
actual intentions of the police and what evidence may exist that the 
officers did not act as they ordinarily do. These courts thus treat po-
lice regulations as having no fourth amendment significance. 275 Yet, 
noncompliance with a police regulation is powerful evidence that the 
fourth amendment has been violated, for when a defendant has raised 
a pretext claim the proper question is not whether the officer could 
have acted as he did but rather whether the officer would have so acted 
absent an invalid purpose.276 Only by putting the proposition this way 
is it possible to uncover and respond to arbitrary police conduct 
which, as we have already seen, is one central concern of the fourth 
amendment. 
VI. REMEDIES: THE LIMITS OF THE EXCLUSIONARY RULE 
The remedy for fourth amendment violations that courts most fre-
quently invoke is the exclusionary rule. As declared in Mapp v. 
Ohio, 277 this rule is "that all evidence obtained by searches and 
seizures in violation of the Constitution is, by that same authority, 
inadmissible."278 In practice, however, the exclusionary rule is some-
what narrower than this quotation would suggest. Because in recent 
years the Supreme Court has stressed that the exclusionary rule's "ma-
jor thrust is a deterrent one,"279 the Court generally has set the bound-
aries of the exclusionary rule by considering just when exclusion 
icy"); United States v. Basey, 816 F.2d 980, 991 (5th Cir. 1987) (lawfully stopped burglary sus-
pect asked to prove he carried adequate liability insurance for the car; when he could not do so 
he was arrested, incident to which evidence of the burglary discovered; pretext contention dis-
missed with the observation "that the deputies had probable cause to and could lawfully arrest 
Basey for violation of the Texas financial responsibility statute"); State v. Bruzzese, 94 N.J. 210, 
229, 245, 463 A.2d 320, 330, 339 (1983) (detective ran routine check on defendant, suspected of 
burglary at which distinctive footprint left, and learned of an outstanding contempt of court 
arrest warrant for failure to appear in municipal court in response to a summons for a minor 
offense, apparently a traffic violation; while executing warrant at defendant's home, boots with 
distinctive pattern similar to the footprint seen and seized; because by statute the officer had "the 
power to serve a contempt warrant," court concludes it irrelevant that, as the dissent put it, the 
detective "conceded that he did not ordinarily serve contempt warrants and that it would have 
been routine practice to call the defendant and tell him to come to police headquarters"), cert. 
denied, 465 U.S. 1030 (1984). 
275. As the court put it in Bruzzese, "there is no need to determine whether [the officer's] 
conduct constituted a 'deviation,' " for allegedly pretextual conduct is not to be "deemed unrea-
sonable merely because a police officer deviates from his department's standard operating proce-
dure." 94 N.J. at 228, 463 A.2d at 329-30. 
276. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986). 
277. 367 U.S. 643 (1961). 
278. 367 U.S. at 655. 
279. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. l, 12 (1968). 
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would significantly further the deterrence objective. Under this ap-
proach, as Professor Amsterdam once put it, the rule is perceived as 
"a needed, but grudgingly taken, medicament; no more should be 
swallowed than is needed to combat the disease."280 
Police regulations sometimes have a bearing on whether the exclu-
sionary rule is an appropriate sanction: for example, a regulation may 
be used to show that illegally seized evidence should be admitted be-
cause of its "inevitable discovery" by lawful means.281 In the follow-
ing discussion, however, my concern is with the possible relevance of 
the police regulatory process to fourth amendment remedies in an 
even more direct fashion. Two separate issues are considered. One 
focuses on a more controversial limitation upon the exclusionary 
rule,282 the so-called "good faith" doctrine; the question is whether or 
not police reliance upon a departmental rule or policy should be 
deemed to constitute a form of "good faith" action that makes the 
suppression remedy unnecessary. The second issue relates to a possi-
ble need to supplement the exclusionary rule because it is admittedly 
an imperfect fourth amendment remedy, one which comes into play 
only when illegal police activity has uncovered evidence of criminal 
280. Amsterdam, Search, Seizure, and Section 2255: A Comment, 112 U. PA. L. REv. 378, 
389 (1964). 
281. The "inevitable discovery" doctrine is a subset of the broader proposition that it is inap-
propriate to exclude evidence that cannot fairly be characterized as a "fruit" of the antecedent 
fourth amendment violation. As the Supreme Court explained in Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S .. 431, 
447 (1984), "if the government can prove that the evidence would have been obtained inevitably 
and, therefore, would have been admitted regardless of any overreaching by the police, there is 
no rational basis to keep that evidence from the jury in order to ensure the fairness of the trial 
proceedings." But, to ensure that this exception to the fruits doctrine is applied only when those 
circumstances exist, the Court cautioned in Williams, the prosecution must "establish by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence that the information ultimately or inevitably would have been discov-
ered by lawful means." 467 U.S. at 444. Just as with the previously discussed pretext doctrine, 
the critical word here is "would"; it is again not good enough that the police could have lawfully 
uncovered the evidence on some alternative basis. 
This means, of course, that in many circumstances the courts are well advised to inquire 
whether or not a relevant police policy existed. The presence or absence of such policy may 
determine the critical fact question whether or not certain other events inevitably would have 
occurred. E.g., State v. Badgett, 200 Conn. 412, 434, 512 A.2d 160, 172 (1986) (although defen-
dant had been lawfully arrested, search of his car which uncovered drugs was unlawful because 
not on probable cause and because delayed and thus not incident to arrest; remand for determi-
nation of whether drugs would inevitably have been discovered in inventory, which necessitates 
consideration of "whether such a search would have been conducted according to standard ~tate 
police operating procedures"). 
282. Compare, e.g., Ingber, Defending the Citadel: The Dangerous Attack of "Reasonable 
Good Faith," 36 V AND. L. REV. 1511 (1983); LaFave, The Fourth Amendment in an Imperfect 
World: On Drawing ''Bright Lines" and "Good Faith," 43 U. PITI. L. REv. 307 (1982); Mertens 
& Wasserstrom, supra note 31; all opposing the "good faith" exception with, e.g., Ball, Good 
Faith and the Fourth Amendment: The ''Reasonable" Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 69 J. 
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 635 (1978); Carrington, Good Faith Mistakes and the Exclusionary 
Rule, 1 CRIM. J. ETHICS, Surnrner/Fall 1982, at 35; Jensen & Hart, The Good Faith Restatement 
of the Exclusionary Rule, 13 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 916 (1982). 
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activity by one who both (i) has standing to object to that unconstitu-
tional conduct, and (ii) is a person the authorities are interested in 
prosecuting. Specifically, this second issue concerns whether court-
mandated police rulemaking is in some circumstances a necessary or 
appropriate additional means for protecting fourth amendment rights. 
Justice White, dissenting in Stone v. Powell, 283 expressed the view 
that the exclusionary rule 
should be substantially modified so as to prevent its application in those 
many circumstances where the evidence at issue was seized by an officer 
acting in the good-faith belief that his conduct comported with existing 
law and having reasonable grounds for this belief. These are recurring 
situations; and recurringly evidence is excluded without any realistic ex-
pectation that its exclusion will contribute in the slightest to the pur-
poses of the rule, even though the trial will be seriously affected or the 
indictment dismissed.284 
The Supreme Court has not adopted such an across-the-board "good-
faith" exception, but has recognized two circumstances in which the 
exception does apply. These are the reliance-on-magistrate situation 
in United States v. Leon 285 and the reliance-on-statute situation in Illi-
nois v. Krull. 286 
In Leon, the district court suppressed drugs found in execution of a 
facially valid search warrant because the affidavit for the warrant did 
not establish probable cause. The court of appeals affirmed, but the 
Supreme Court reversed, holding that "the Fourth Amendment exclu-
sionary rule should be modified so as not to bar the use in the prosecu-
tion's case-in-chief of evidence obtained by officers acting in reasonable 
reliance on a search warrant issued by a detached and neutral magis-
trate but ultimately found to be unsupported by probable cause. "287 
The Court grounded this conclusion in a balancing-of-interests analy-
sis, which considered the "substantial social costs" of the exclusionary 
rule on the one hand and, on the other, the benefits of the rule in terms 
of deterrence, which in the Leon circumstances were deemed "margi-
nal or nonexistent."288 The Court concluded that judges did not need 
deterrence and, in any event, would not be deterred by exclusion,289 
283. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
284. 428 U.S. at 538 (White, J., dissenting). 
285. 468 U.S. 897 (1984). 
286. 480 U.S. 340 (1987). 
287. 468 U.S. at 900. 
288. 468 U.S. at 907, 922. 
289. The Court stressed that "there exists no evidence suggesting that judges and magistrates 
are inclined to ignore or subvert the Fourth Amendment," and then added that, in any event, it 
did not appear "that exclusion of evidence seized pursuant to a warrant will have a significant 
deterrent effect on the issuing judge or magistrate." 468 U.S. at 916. 
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and further, that deterrence of the police simply was not involved in 
this setting because "there is no police illegality and thus nothing to 
deter. "290 
In Krull, concerning search of an auto junkyard pursuant to an 
administrative inspection statute later found unconstitutional, the 
Court held that "a good-faith exception to the Fourth Amendment 
exclusionary rule applies when an officer's reliance on the constitution-
ality of a statute is objectively reasonable, but the statute is subse-
quently declared unconstitutional."291 In abandoning its own clearly 
established pre-Leon rule that police conduct undertaken pursuant to 
an unconstitutional legislative conferral of search or seizure authority 
is unlawful and thus a basis for suppression under the Mapp exclusion-
ary rule,292 the Court concluded that the "approach used in Leon is 
equally applicable to the present case."293 The Court looked for and 
found factors equivalent to those which were determinative in Leon. 
Specifically, the Court in Krull first reasoned that legislators were not 
in need of deterrence and would not be deterred by exclusion.294 The 
Court then declared: "The application of the exclusionary rule to sup-
press evidence obtained by an officer acting in objectively reasonable 
reliance on a statute would have as little deterrent effect on the of-
ficer's actions as would the exclusion of evidence when an officer acts 
in objectively reasonable reliance on a warrant."295 
Does it follow that a "good-faith" exception to the exclusionary 
rule should also be recognized in those cases in which the officer who 
conducted the seizure or search (now determined to be illegal) reason-
ably relied upon some police rule or policy? From the standpoint of 
deterring the officer who made the search or seizure, one can argue 
that suppression where the officer relied upon a police regulation 
makes no more sense than where the officer relied upon a statute or a 
warrant. Moreover, it can be contended that such an extension of the 
"good-faith" exception would have the added advantage, even more so 
than the possible judicial uses of police regulations discussed earlier, of 
290. 468 U.S. at 921; 
291. 480 U.S. at 346. 
292. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85 (1979); Torres v. Puerto Rico, 442 U.S. 465 (1979); 
Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 
443 (1971); Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967). 
293. 480 U.S. at 349. 
294. The Court declared that "legislators, like judicial officers, are not the focus of the rule," 
for like judges they are not inclined to act contrary to the fourth amendment, and added that 
there was "nothing to indicate that applying the exclusionary rule to evidence seized pursuant to 
the statute prior to the declaration of its invalidity will act as a significant, additional deterrent" 
on legislators enacting such statutes. 480 U.S. at 350-52. 
295. 480 U.S. at 349. 
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providing police departments with strong encouragement to engage in 
careful self-study to produce clear and comprehensive rules governing 
day-to-day police practices.296 This would in fact advance the cause of 
deterrence: "Police will be most effectively deterred from unconstitu-
tional conduct if police departments respond institutionally to search 
and seizure decisions by continually promulgating field regulations re-
flective of developing fourth amendment law, and by training officers 
to follow such regulations."297 In addition, so the argument proceeds, 
this also would focus the exclusionary rule on instances in which there 
were institutional failures to protect fourth amendment rights, for (as-
suming the individual officer complied with the existing policy) the 
costs of evidence suppression would quite properly not be imposed 
where "the police department in question has taken seriously its re-
sponsibility to adhere to the fourth amendment."298 So focused, the 
exclusionary rule would have a much more solid grounding, for it 
would "be based upon an institutional, or systemic, view of 
deterrence. "299 
Although these are rather compelling arguments, it is nonetheless 
doubtful - at least to one not enamored with the "good faith" excep-
tion the Supreme Court has given us so far - whether such use of 
police regulations in fourth amendment adjudication is desirable.300 
The Supreme Court in Leon and Krull asserted that the fourth amend-
ment exclusionary rule has no application to judges and legislators, 
unlike police; these distinctions were critical to the Court's analysis 
and to the result reached in these two cases. But it cannot as plausibly 
be asserted that the exclusionary rule is not directed to those upper-
level police officials who are responsible for formulating law enforce-
ment policies touching upon fourth amendment rights. It may be true 
that police administrators, as compared to officers on the beat, are not 
directly "engaged in the often competitive enterprise of ferreting out 
crime"301 and thus are less tempted to cut corners. Yet there is no 
apparent empirical basis for concluding that law enforcement person-
nel at the policymaking level are so intensely committed to fourth 
296. Comment, Rethinking the Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule, 130 U. PA. L. 
R.Ev. 1610, 1618-19 (1982) ("The heretofore absent incentive for the promulgation of such regu-
lations can be provided by permitting, under a good faith exception, the use of evidence seized 
pursuant to such regulations."). 
297. Id. at 1618. 
298. Kaplan, The Limits of the Exclusionary Rule, 26 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1027, 1050 (1974). 
299. Comment, supra note 296, at 1619. For a useful discussion of why that view of deter-
rence is a more sensible one, see id. at 1627-31. 
300. See LaFave, "The Seductive Call of Expediency": United States v. Leon, Its Rationale 
and Ramifications, 1984 U. ILL. L. R.Ev. 895. 
301. Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 14 (1948). 
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amendment values that they can always be trusted to draft regulations 
that sufficiently respect those values. As a result, one can hardly be 
sanguine about the prospects of such draftsmanship if those officials 
knew - which would be the message of a "good-faith" exception op-
erating in this area - that even if a regulation does not satisfy the 
requirements of the amendment, it will nonetheless provide "a grace 
period during which the police may freely perform unreasonable 
searches. "302 
I am not suggesting here that some judgment must be made about 
the malevolence level of police administrators as compared to, on the 
one hand, judges and legislators and, on the other, beat patrolmen. 
The fourth amendment is not concerned merely with calculated and 
deliberate noncompliance with the amendment's proscriptions, and 
thus the exclusionary rule is also applicable to the more common 
fourth amendment violations resulting from carelessness. As the 
Supreme Court recognized in Stone v. Powell, 303 what the exclusionary 
rule demonstrates is "that our society attaches serious consequences to 
violation of constitutional rights," which encourages those making 
critical search and seizure decisions "to incorporate Fourth Amend-
ment ideals into their value system."304 In other words, the exclusion-
ary rule serves not only to deter the occasional ill-spirited officer, but, 
more importantly to influence police behavior more generally by creat-
ing an "incentive to err on the side of constitutional behavior."3os 
As I discussed earlier, there are many other ways, without such an 
extension of the "good-faith" exception, in which police regulations in 
fact are and potentially might be brought to bear in a meaningful way 
upon the adjudication of fourth amendment issues .. Thus, it is espe-
cially important that those officers responsible for preparing and 
promulgating these regulations do "incorporate Fourth Amendment 
ideals into their value system" and, when in doubt, "err on the side of 
constitutional behavior." The importance of such a frame of reference 
is further highlighted by the much greater potential an ill-drafted reg-
ulation carries for harm than the single mistake by an officer in the 
field, which ordinarily affects but one person. In this and other ways, 
"Fourth Amendment violations become more, not less, reprehensible 
when they are the product of Government policy rather than an indi-
302. Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 366 (1987) (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
This grace period might well be substantial, for if the very existence of the police regulation 
presents a barrier to application of the exclusionary rule, a defendant would have no incentive to 
bring that regulation into question. 
303. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). 
304. 428 U.S. at 492. 
305. United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 561 (1982). 
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vidual policeman's errors of judgment."306 That explains why "any 
rule intended to prevent Fourth Amendment violations must operate 
not only upon individual law enforcement officers but also upon those 
who set policy for them."307 On balance, grounding a "good-faith" 
exception to the exclusionary rule in reliance upon police regulations 
is undesirable. 3os 
Another possible remedy for fourth amendment violations, espe-
cially those of a recurring nature, is an injunction. Although tradi-
tional principles of equity law limit somewhat the circumstances in 
which this remedy is available, 309 courts no longer will decline to en-
join continuing fourth amendment violations by unquestioned accept-
ance of the hoary maxim that equity will not interfere with criminal 
law enforcement.310 There are, however, certain practical considera-
tions that courts sometimes consider in determining the appropriate-
ness of injunctive relief. For example, courts have declined to issue 
injunctions against police violations on the grounds (i) that it was im-
possible to formulate an injunction clearly expressing what was pro-
hibited and what was permitted,311 and (ii) that it was not feasible to 
involve the court in the day-to-day operations of the police depart-
ment. 312 These concerns are certainly legitimate. 
The problem of drafting a clear injunction is particularly acute in 
the fourth amendment area, for it is especially difficult to define with 
306. United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531, 558 n.18 (1975) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
307. 422 U.S. at 558 n.18 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
308. This conclusion does not call into question those decisions holding that when a police 
officer is a defendant in a§ 1983 action, he may assert his good faith as a defense, Pierson v. Ray, 
386 U.S. 547 (1967), and that such good faith can be established by the officer's reliance upon 
information conveyed to him by his department concerning the extent of his fourth amendment 
authority, see, e.g., Dominguez v. Beame, 603 F.2d 337 (2d Cir. 1979); Thompson v. Anderson, 
447 F. Supp. 584 (D. Md. 1977). The considerations in that context are very different, See 
LaFave, supra note 282, at 343-47. 
309. The plaintiff must lack an adequate remedy at law, see, e.g., Gomez v. Layton, 394 F.2d 
764, 766 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (stressing that courts "are not always required to await criminal trials 
which may never materialize in order to vindicate crucial constitutional rights"), and must show 
there is an imminent threat of harm, see, e.g., City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 111 
(1983) (plaintiff, who alleged he was subjected to a chokehold after he stopped for traffic viola· 
tion, could not have such conduct enjoined "[a]bsent a sufficient likelihood that he will again be 
wronged in a similar way"). 
310. See, e.g., Harmon v. Commissioner of Police, 274 Mass. 56, 174 N.E. 198 (1931) (court 
refused to interfere with police who had already searched defendant's club 70 times without 
finding any illegal activity). 
311. Wilson v. Webster, 315 F. Supp. 1104 (C.D. Cal. 1970). 
312. Hughes v. Rizzo, 282 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Pa. 1968). As one appellate tribunal elabo· 
rated, courts "should avoid unnecessarily dampening the vigor of a police department by becom· 
ing too deeply involved in the department's daily operations, both because of the vital public 
interests at stake, and because of the danger that the court could become enmeshed in endless 
time-consuming bickering and controversy." Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1351 (3d Cir. 
1971). 
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precision such concepts as probable cause and unreasonableness. If an 
injunction were to do no more, in effect, than command the officers in 
a department not to search unreasonably, a particular officer "will 
either disregard the injunction when he realizes that it fails to give him 
any indication of how to act in the given situation ... , or he will react 
too cautiously and refuse to do anything at all for fear of being held in 
contempt."313 But there is a solution to this problem: the court might 
simply "direct appropriate orders to the responsible officials, with a 
view to having the situation corrected by them intemally,"314 a pro-
cess "by which the police can be required to identify, articulate, and 
defend, as well as be afforded an opportunity to change, their official 
policies and practices."315 In short, the court could mandate rulemak-
ing regarding particular fourth amendment activities for which ex-
isting police rules are either inadequate or nonexistent. 
This approach is advantageous for several reasons. As Professor 
Herman Goldstein has noted: 
When used in this manner the process contains a number of the elements 
so seriously lacking in some of the most commonly proposed systems for 
controlling police conduct. It operates on the top police administrator, 
thereby applying pressure to the entire agency rather than to individual 
police officers. It focuses upon administratively tolerated and continuing 
patterns of police violations, rather than isolated incidents of wrongdo-
ing. It is more concerned with preventing such violations in the future 
than in providing redress for the past. And it has the potential for con-
tributing, in a very significant way, to stimulating police agencies to bet-
ter control their personnel through the structuring of discretion by 
requiring that the agency itself produce explicit guidelines for police 
functioning in important areas. By depending on the agency to formu-
late the policy, the court may produce a much more workable operating 
code tailored to local needs than the court could ever prepare on its 
own.316 
This technique is illustrated by the actions of the federal district 
court in Council of Organizations on Philadelphia Police Accountability 
and Responsibility v. Rizzo. 317 The court found that the violation of 
constitutional rights by a small percentage of Philadelphia police 
could not be dismissed as rare, isolated instances, and that, while such 
acts did not result from a "conscious" departmental policy of violating 
constitutional rights, it was departmental policy to discourage the fil-
313. Comment, Injunctive Relief for Violations of Constitutional Rights by the Police, 45 U. 
CoLO. L. REV. 91, 99 (1973). 
314. Lewis v. Kugler, 446 F.2d 1343, 1351 (3d Cir. 1971). 
315. Gomez v. Wilson, 477 F.2d 411, 426 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (Bazelon, C.J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
316. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 179. 
317. 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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ing of citizen complaints, to resist disclosure of final disposition of 
complaints, and "to avoid or minimize the consequences of proven 
police misconduct."318 The court directed the defendants - the 
mayor, city managing director, and police commissioner - to prepare 
"a comprehensive program" for dealing with the problem, which was 
to include: (1) revision of police manuals to address such matters as 
"unnecessary damage to property and other unreasonable conduct in 
executing search warrants" and "limitations on pursuit of persons 
charged only with summary offenses"; (2) "revision of procedures for 
processing complaints against police"; and (3) prompt notification to 
concerned parties of the action taken in response to such 
complaints.319 
In Rizzo v. Goode, 320 the Supreme Court reversed. After first con-
cluding there was no "threshold statutory liability" upon which equi-
table relief could be granted,321 the Court next expressed concern that 
the district judge's injunctive order, "significantly revising the internal 
procedures of the Philadelphia police department, was indisputably a 
sharp limitation on the department's 'latitud~ in the "dispatch of its 
own internal affairs."' " 322 Relying upon the rule that in federal eq-
uity cases "the nature of the violation determines the scope of the rem-
edy" and also upon "important considerations of federalism,"323 the 
Court concluded: 
Contrary to the District Court's fiat pronouncement that a federal 
court's legal power to "supervise the functioning of the police depart-
ment ... is firmly established," it is the foregoing cases and principles 
that must govern consideration of the type of injunctive relief granted 
here. When it injected itself by injunctive decree into the internal disci-
plinary affairs of this state agency, the District Court departed from 
these precepts. 324 
This characterization of the district court's action is both unfortu-
nate and inaccurate. In fact, as the three Rizzo dissenters noted, the 
district court's "remedy is carefully delineated, worked out within the 
administrative structure rather than superimposed by edict upon it, 
318. 357 F. Supp. at 1318. 
319. 357 F. Supp. at 1321. 
320. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). 
321. 423 U.S. at 377. The Court concluded "that none of the petitioners had deprived the 
respondent classes of any rights secured under the Constitution," and that "petitioners' failure to 
act in the face of a statistical pattern" of fourth amendment violations from a small percentage of 
the police department was not the equivalent of the affirmative action required under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1983. 423 U.S. at 377, 376 (emphasis in original). 
322. 423 U.S. at 379. 
323. 423 U.S. at 378. 
324. 423 U.S. at 380 (ellipses in original). 
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and essentially, and concededly, 'livable.' " 325 It carried with it the 
special benefits described earlier; In particular, it left the police oom-
missioner "free to frame orders to patrolmen and alter enforcement 
procedures to achieve the desired result with a minimum adverse effect 
on the morale and efficiency of his police department, u326 while mini-
mizing "the danger that federal injunctive remedies might inhibit con-
stitutional as well as unconstitutional law enforcement practices.''327 
Rizzo, then, represents yet another instance in which the Supreme 
Court failed to take full advantage of the police policymaking device 
as a meaningful technique for the protection of fourth amendment 
rights. Particularly regrettable is that Rizzo apparently bars federal 
courts in injunction proceedings from granting the type of relief that 
would often best accommodate the interests of the plaintiffs, the police 
department, and the enjoining court. Though admittedly the scope of 
the Rizzo holding is not entirely clear, 328 it appears to proscribe the 
mandated-rulemaking form of relief even when not accompanied by 
the more controversial features of the Rizzo district judge's order. 
That is, if a district court "stopped short of reorganizing the depart-
ment's disciplinary apparatus and simply required the Police Commis-
sioner to develop rules to govern the conduct of the individual police 
malefactors," it seems that "the Rizzo holdings on Section 1983 liabil-
ity and equitable restraint combine to render this limited remedy un-
available.''329 The most disturbing aspect of Rizzo, consequently, "is 
that, in its haste to reject the relief granted, the Court has erected a 
barrier to far less intrusive remedies."3Jo 
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND REFLECTIONS 
"American police have always been expected to exercise discretion 
in the performance of their duties.''331 Discretion involves "the mak-
ing of decisions and implies that a decisionmaker can make choices 
325. 423 U.S. at 387 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
326. Note, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 
YALE L.J. 143, 149 (1968) (footnote omitted). 
327. Id. at 153. 
328. See Note, Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies for Police Misconduct, 62 VA. L. REv. 
1259, 1272 (1976), commenting on the uncertainty regarding "whether high police officials could 
be proper defendants when the magnitude of the abuses is different in kind or degree, but either 
no demonstrable policy exists or plaintiffs can only establish one that has evolved de facto at 
lower levels in the police department hierarchy." 
329. Id. at 1279-80. 
330. Id. at 1283. 
331. Williams, Police Rulemaking Revisited: Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem, 41 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 123, 181. 
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among alternative courses of action,"332 which is the essence of police 
work; it "is fraught with decision," and "patrol officers exercise choice 
constantly."333 It is those circumstances- complexity plus discretion 
-which prompted the recommendation in the ABF Criminal Justice 
Survey (often echoed since by commentators and in reports and law 
reform proposals, and sometimes acted upon by the police) that police 
agencies draft written policies for the guidance of their officers. Dis-
cretion is inevitable, but in a democratic society the discretion allowed 
public officials should not be "unconfined and vagrant"; it needs to be 
"canalized within banks that keep it from overftowing."334 
I have assumed, as have many others, that rulemaking is desirable 
even with regard to the fourth amendment activities of the police, de-
spite the fact that the exclusionary rule assures considerable attention 
to such police conduct by the courts. The existence of a substantial 
body of case law on the subject of search and seizure is no reason to 
forgo rulemaking, for there is ample room for creative administrative 
regulation within the interstices of extant fourth amendment doc-
trine. 335 What Amsterdam calls "the more :flexible and professional 
technique of rulemaking"336 is especially promising as a means for (1) 
affording greater protection against arbitrary searches and seizures, a 
major fourth amendment concern, (2) assuring a more meaningful 
contribution of police expertise, and (3) controlling those kinds of 
fourth amendment activities that almost never reach the courts and 
thus are untouched by the operation of the exclusionary rule. 
It is fair to ask at this point whether or not, in the new regime of 
police rulemaking, these benefits have been fully realized. The answer 
quite clearly is no. With respect to the fourth amendment activities of 
the police, there has been (presumably) a fair amount of police 
rulemaking and (unquestionably) a substantial amount of court review 
of police searches and seizures. Yet the necessary synergism is lack-
ing; it is not ordinarily the case that law enforcement guidelines consti-
tute the centerpiece of this judicial analysis, and therefore it presently 
cannot be said that rulemaking has contributed favorably to our 
332. Reiss, Consequences of Compliance and Deterrence Models of Law Enforcement for the 
Exercise of Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984, at 83, 89. 
333. Bayley & Bittner, Leaming the Skills of Policing, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Au· 
tumn 1984, at 35, 36. 
334. Panama Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 440 (1935) (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
335. See Caplan, supra note 31, at 504 ("even in an area of the law that appears to be satu· 
rated by judicial decisions there is much uncharted terrain for the agency to map"); McGowan, 
supra note 35, at 677 ("even under the shadow of constitutional commands, there is room for 
experimentation in law enforcement methods; and the administrative agency model is a demon-
strably effective means of pursuing such a pragmatic course"). 
336. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 417. 
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fourth amendment jurisprudence, improving in the process the quality 
of police search and seizure practices. There are three significant rea-
sons for this: 
(1) Insufficient judicial encouragement ofrulemaking. "To the ex-
tent that the judiciary seeks out police policy as an aid in its own deci-
sionmaking, instead of focusing only on the conduct of the officers 
involved in a particular case, it can inspire more rulemaking by the 
police."337 Such judicial stimulation of rulemaking is present to a de-
gree in the Supreme Court's opinions; there are several fourth amend-
ment doctrines which by their nature encourage the adoption of police 
policies and regulations. Illustrative are the Bertine "standardized 
procedures" rule; the Camara "reasonable . . . administrative stan-
dards" requirement; the Brown "plan embodying explicit, neutral limi-
tations" concept; and even the Scott "objective assessment" test, which 
lower courts have often interpreted as requiring inquiry, upon a pre-
text challenge, into whether the police deviated from their usual prac-
tice. Garner deserves special mention, for it shows that when the law 
enforcement community takes pains to educate the Court about what 
is mandated by police regulations across the country, the Court will 
take notice~ 
Closer inspection of some of these and other developments, how-
ever, supports the conclusion that the Supreme Court has fallen short 
of doing all that it might have done. The inventory cases, for example, 
are sufficiently imprecise to lend themselves to the interpretation that 
departmental rules on impoundment and inventory are not really nec-
essary. Thus, in Opperman the Court asserts a "standard police proce-
dures" requirement but never refers to or quotes any regulations in the 
Vermillion Police Department. Indeed, the Court finally refers to the 
quoted term as if it simply means what police departments generally 
often do, leaving it to concurring Justice Powell to invoke the protec-
tion-against-arbitrariness concern and to note that this concern was 
met by the Vermillion department's requirement of complete inven-
tory of all impounded vehicles. As for the inspection cases, the sad 
fact is that the Court has created a hypertrophic exception to the war-
rant requirement and then made the worst of a bad situation by as-
suming that when no warrant is needed administrative regulations are 
likewise unnecessary. Perhaps even more noteworthy is the Court's 
improvident failure on other occasions to make police rulemaking the 
focal point of a decision. This has occurred both within the context of 
337. Caplan, supra note 31, at 50~. 
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the exclusionary rule, as with the Robinson-Gustafson tandem, and 
without, as with Sitz and Rizzo. 
(2) Nonexistent or inadequate judicial evaluation of rules. A second 
important function of courts with respect to police regulations is to 
pass judgment on the reasonableness of the regulations; even under a 
rulemaking regime, courts "continue to be, as before, the ultimate 
shield of the citizen from the improper actions of his govemment."338 
Here as well, the actions of the Supreme Court are less than encourag-
ing, for the Court has kept as much distance from existing police rules 
as possible. In such cases as Opperman, Robinson, and Gustafson the 
Court discusses extant rules only in footnotes, and then typically only 
to disclaim their relevance. Similarly, in Sitz the Court largely ignored 
the guidelines that had been promulgated regarding sobriety check-
points. Bertine is unique; it is the only case in which the defendant 
specifically challenged a particular departmental regulation, but the 
Court summarily dismissed the contention by misreading the regula-
tion as containing "standardized criteria guiding an officer's decision 
to impound a vehicle."339 
The Sitz case is especially disappointing, for the majority seems not 
to have grasped the fact that the existence of police guidelines does not 
call for total abdication by the Court of its fourth amendment respon-
sibilities. The police guidelines in Sitz, which authorized resort to 
DWI checkpoints pursuant to procedures mostly unspecified by the 
Court, were upheld pursuant to the startling proposition that "the 
choice among such reasonable alternatives" was entirely for "politi-
cally accountable officials" to make. 340 In one stroke, the Court man-
aged to avoid any meaningful review of whether the Michigan 
guidelines (a) sufficiently minimized the intrusion upon those stopped 
at checkpoints or (b) were sufficiently grounded in a showing of the 
relative predicted effectiveness of checkpoints. If, as the Court earlier 
stated in Robinson, "such operating procedures are not ... determina-
tive of the constitutional issues,"341 then Sitz falls well short of even 
the more limited judicial review appropriate within a regime of police 
rulemaking. 
Exactly what posture should a reviewing court take with respect to 
a police regulation? Surely there is some middle ground between the 
Sitz approach and that of an earlier era when applicable law enforce-
ment guidelines were treated as if they were totally irrelevant. With-
338. McGowan, supra note 35, at 686. 
339. 479 U.S. at 376 n.7. 
340. Michigan Dept. of State Police v. Sitz, 110 S. Ct. 2481, 2487 (1990). 
341. United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 221 n.2 (1973). 
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out suggesting that the analogy is apt in all respects, it seems that 
established administrative law doctrine respecting judicial review of 
administrative action is useful in this setting as well. Under this doc-
trine, courts give some deference to professional judgment. As the 
Supreme Court put it in Youngberg v. Romeo, 342 "courts must show 
deference to the judgment exercised by a qualified professional," that 
is, "a person competent whether by education, training or experience, 
to make a particular decision at issue."343 If, as in Romeo, the profes-
sional judgment of adnµrustrators in a state hospital regarding appro-
priate treatment programs is entitled to deference, then surely 
deference to professional judgment is likewise appropriate regarding 
police officials who (as put in an unobjectionable part of Sitz) "have a 
unique understanding of, and a responsibility for, limited public re-
sources, including a finite number of police officers."344 
I am not suggesting, however, that invocation of "professional 
judgment" commands automatic judicial approval of and deference to 
any and all administrative decisions. Especially when constitutional 
limitations are at issue, as they most certainly are when the police reg-
ulations govern fourth amendment activities, the review function of 
the courts must be performed with sufficient intensity to ensure ac-
countability and fairness in the rulemaking process. The rulemaking 
agency must be required to satisfy the court that the decisionmaking 
leading to the rule at issue was both informed and rational. 
Such was the conclusion in the leading administrative law case of 
Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Association v. State Farm Mutual Auto-
mobile Insurance Co., 345 where insurance companies petitioned for re-
view of an order of the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration that rescinded a preexisting safety rule requiring that 
newly manufactured automobiles be equipped with air bags or seat 
belts. The Supreme Court, in the course of agreeing with the court of 
appeals that NHTSA had failed to show sufficient justification for this 
action, first decided that a rule modification or rescission was subject 
to the same intensity of review as standards initially promulgated via 
informal rulemaking. The Court then proceeded to elaborate what 
such review entailed: the burden is on the agency to "cogently explain 
why it has exercised its discretion in a given manner," and this expla-
342. 457 U.S. 307, 323 n.30 (1982). 
343. 457 U.S. at 323 n.30. For other illustrations of this principle, see Goldman v. Wein-
berger, 475 U.S. 503, 507-09 (1986); Irving lndep. School Dist. v. Tatro, 468 U.S. 883, 891-92 
(1984); and Board of Educ., Hendrick Hudson Cent. School Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 207-
08 (1982). 
344. 110 S. Ct. at 2487. 
345. 463 U.S. 29 (1983). 
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nation must be sufficient to enable the court to conclude that the rule 
"was the product of reasoned decisionmaking."346 A greater showing 
is needed "than the minimum rationality a statute must bear in order 
to withstand analysis under the Due Process Clause," and conse-
quently "the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a 
satisfactory explanation for its action including a 'rational connection 
between the facts found and the choice made.' "347 What this means, 
the Court in State Farm added, is that an agency rule cannot survive 
judicial review 
if the agency has relied on factors which [it is not allowed] to consider, 
entirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before the 
agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a difference in 
view or the product of agency expertise. 348 
If such "hard look" review349 is appropriate for the NHTSA decision 
on passive restraints in vehicles, then surely no lesser judicial scrutiny 
should suffice regarding the decision of the Michigan Department of 
State Police to use DWI checkpoints to combat drunken driving. 
(3) Failure of litigants to focus on rules and their rationale. The 
preceding discussion emphasized that the Supreme Court has on sev-
eral occasions failed to take advantage of existing opportunities either 
to stimulate police rulemaking or to subject such rulemaking to mean-
ingful review. But that is not the entire story. Yet another reason 
exists why the perceived benefits of police rulemaking regarding their 
fourth amendment activities have not yet been fully realized: very 
often the appellate courts (including the Supreme Court) are not pro-
vided with the information needed to put the specific conduct at issue 
into the appropriate context. "The fact material which the appellate 
judicial tribunal has official liberty to consider in making its decision is 
346. 463 U.S. at 48, 52. 
347. 463 U.S. at 43 & n.9 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines, Inc. v. United States, 371 U.S. 
156, 158 (1962)). 
348. 463 U.S. at 43. 
349. This phrase comes from the opinion of Judge Leventhal in Greater Boston Television 
Corp. v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841 (D.C. Cir. 1970), in which he stated that judicial intervention is 
necessary "if the court becomes aware, especially from a combination of danger signals, that the 
agency has not really taken a 'hard look' at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged 
in reasoned decision-making." 444 F.2d at 851 (footnote omitted). , 
As explained in G. ROBINSON, E. GELLHORN & H. BRUFF, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 
182, 197 {3d ed. 1986): 
Although Judge Leventhal says that it is the agency that must take a hard look at the issues 
before it, the phrase is also used more loosely to i9dicate that the court in a case like ••. 
State Farm takes a hard look at the agency's decision! .•. Although State Farm does not 
invoke hard look review by name, the Court's decision is generally regarded as having rati-
fied it. 
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largely walled in."350 It consists of the record made below and such 
data as may be incorporated in a brief, which in most search and 
seizure cases collectively include neither the relevant police regula-
tions nor supporting information that would permit a State Farm-style 
hard-look review of the applicable law enforcement policy. 
Such lack of information may have a profound effect upon the way 
in which the fourth amendment issue before the court is perceived and 
resolved, as can be illustrated by comparing one of the decisions from 
my earlier exegesis with a more typical limited-record case. The for-
mer is the Garner decision, which is an especially attractive example of 
reliance upon rulemaking to enhance fourth amendment jurispru-
dence. In that case, because of the information provided in the record 
and briefs, it was possible for the Supreme Court to place an important 
decision of an individual officer (to use deadly force) into the context 
of his department's official policy regarding such conduct, and then to 
place the rule of that department into the context of law enforcement 
expertise more generally, as reflected in the relevant rules of a great 
many other police departments. Because so many departments had 
authorized the use of deadly force in circumstances significantly nar-
rower than allowed at common law, the Court was able to conclude 
that there was no police necessity supporting continued adherence to 
the common law position. 
In stark contrast to Garner is New York v. Belton, 351 where a New 
York trooper stopped a. vehicle for a traffic violation and then, because 
he believed the occupants were in possession of marijuana, arrested the 
four occupants and subsequently searched the passenger compartment 
of that vehicle. At issue was the lawfulness of the vehicle search, 
which the Supreme Court resolved by announcing the broad rule that 
in any case in which "a policeman has made a lawful custodial arrest 
of the occupant of an automobile, he may, as a contemporaneous inci-
dent of that arrest, search the passenger compartment of that automo-
bile. "352 Why such a broad rule? Because, the Court explained, the 
police were entitled to a "straightforward rule,"353 which by implica-
tion the Court indicated was unachievable by any narrower direction 
to the police expressed in terms of the arrestee's actual access to the 
vehicle notwithstanding his arrest. 
At precisely this point, the issue in Belton seems remarkably simi-
lar to that in Garner, for an oft-stated justification for the common law 
350. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 28. 
351. 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
352. 453 U.S. at 460 (footnotes omitted). 
353. 453 U.S. at 459. 
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any-felony rule regarding deadly force is that the police are entitled to 
a clearly stated and easy-to-apply rule - an argument before the 
Court in Garner and urged by the dissenters in that case. That pur-
ported justification failed in Garner because the Court learned the po-
lice had concluded as a rulemaking matter that narrower limits upon 
use of deadly force were feasible and could be expressed in departmen-
tal regulations. This strongly suggests that before the "straightfor-
ward rule" argument should carry the day in Belton, it would again be 
instructive to know what extant police regulations had to say on this 
matter. Did the trooper's conduct in Belton conform to the New York 
State Police guidelines on when a vehicle may be searched incident to 
arrest? If not (or, even if so), does that rule identify and articulate in 
reasonably clear fashion specific circumstances short of the all-cases 
holding in Belton in which an incident-to-arrest vehicle search is per-
mitted? If so (or, even more important, if not), do the rules of other 
law enforcement agencies on this same subject indicate that police 
have been able to articulate and live with a less expansive vehicle 
search rule? Despite the relevance of these Garner-style queries, the 
Supreme Court was in no position to pursue them in Belton, for the 
record and briefs did not include the information essential to their 
resolution. 
The other point here is that even if a police regulation is put 
squarely before the Supreme Court (for example, because the defen-
dant is specifically challenging it, as in Bertine); chances are the record 
will lack the supporting information necessary for a hard-look judicial 
review. In Bertine, the defendant contended "that the inventory 
search of his van was unconstitutional because departmental regula-
tions gave the police officers discretion to choose between impounding 
his van and parking and locking it in a public parking place."354 At 
that juncture, it would have helped to know precisely why the Boulder 
Police Department had formulated the impoundment regulations as 
they had, and specifically why the Department had concluded that the 
regulations need not provide any guidance on when the impoundment 
alternative was permissible. But there is nothing on these points in the 
record, which merely contains some comments by the inventorying 
officer on his understanding of the purposes underlying the Depart-
ment's inventory procedures. 
Although these three shortcomings make a more particularized 
critique of rulemaking in fourth amendment adjudication difficult, a 
354. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 375 (1987). 
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few additional observations are in order. Five problem areas deserve 
attention: 
(i) The relevance of rules. The Supreme Court's general disinclina-
tion to mandate or assess police rules raises anew the fundamental 
question of precisely what significance a pertinent law enforcement 
regulation should have when a court sets out to determine fourth 
amendment issues in an exclusionary rule context. 355 In part, this 
concerns how compliance or noncompliance with the regulation bears 
on the issue of suppression. One possible position is that exclusion is 
unnecessary when the police officer reasonably relied upon a rule of his 
agency. But as discussed earlier, this proposition is unsound. It is 
grounded in an unduly narrow conception of the exclusionary rule's 
deterrence function, and would undesirably skew the pressures which 
ought to operate upon police administrators drafting and promulgat-
ing regulations. 
Another position is reflected by United States v. Caceres, 356 hold-
ing that the failure of an IRS agent to follow IRS electronic surveil-
lance regulations did not require suppression. The Court reasoned 
that it could not "ignore the possibility that a rigid application of an 
exclusionary rule to every regulatory violation could have a serious 
deterrent impact on the formulation of additional standards to govern 
prosecutorial and police procedures," and concluded that 
[i]n the long run, it is far better to have rules like those contained in the 
IRS Manual, and to tolerate occasional erroneous administration of the 
kind displayed by this record, than either to have no rules except those 
mandated by statute, or to have them framed in a mere precatory 
form.357 
This reasoning is rather compelling, and seems particularly applicable 
in the present context, where the police via rulemaking have imposed 
limits on their own authority beyond those courts could be expected to 
inflict as a matter of fourth amendment doctrine. 35s 
It is clear, however, that this laissez faire approach is not appropri-
ate for all forms of fourth amendment activity, because sometimes the 
existence of and compliance with administrative regulations is - or 
ought to be - the very warp and woof of the controlling doctrine. If, 
355. Of course, also of great importance is the question of what significance a rule violation 
should have in other contexts, such as a civil suit or disciplinary action. See H. GOLDSTEIN, 
supra note 31, at 122-24. 
356. 440 U.S. 741 (1979). 
357. 440 U.S. at 755-56. 
358. For example, as noted in TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 17, concerning the 
New York City Police Department's stop-and-frisk guidelines: "Emphasis was not placed upon 
defining the law so much as it was upon urging the police to exercise restraint and to act well 
within the outer limits of their prescribed authority." 
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as seems to be the case, the Bertine "standardized procedures" doc-
trine is intended both to ensure against arbitrary searches and seizures 
and to permit departments the opportunity to determine in the first 
instance how the legitimate objectives of the inventory process can 
best be served, then surely both the existence of reasonable regulations 
and compliance with those regulations are prerequisites to a finding of 
constitutional conduct. Similarly, if the inspection cases mean that 
when the authorities want to be able to conduct inspections absent 
individualized suspicion they must act pursuant to "reasonable stan-
dards" adopted by legislation or administrative regulation, once again 
the existence of and conformance to those limits are essential to a find-
ing of "reasonableness" under the fourth amendment. The same may 
be said of the stop-and-frisk power, where police lacking individual-
ized reasonable suspicion must act pursuant to "a plan embodying ex-
plicit, neutral limitations." In a sense, even the Scott doctrine is of this 
character, for it will not do for the police to contend that upon a pre-
text challenge the courts may inquire into neither their subjective in-
tentions nor whether the conduct deviated from usual practice. 
A harder question is whether noncompliance with regulations 
should be determinative in other fourth amendment circumstances. 
Consider, for example, execution of a search warrant at premises 
known to be unoccupied, an action the courts have quite consistently 
upheld. 359 A police department might for good reason adopt a regula-
tion limiting the circumstances in which warrant execution in the ab-
sence of an occupant is permissible. 360 If such a regulation is violated 
in a particular case, should this require suppression of the evidence 
obtained in execution of the warrant? The logic of Caceres suggests 
not. This would ensure that rulemaking is not discouraged and yet 
would not require that courts maintain a disinterest in compliance 
with existing police regulations. That is, even if the failure to comply 
with a police regulation governing when unoccupied premises may be 
359. The cases, collected in 2 w. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT§ 4.7(c) (2d ed. 1987), find support in the assertion in Dalia v. United 
States, 441U.S.238, 257 (1979), that "it is generally left to the discretion of the executing officers 
to determine the details of how best to proceed with the performance of a search authorized by 
warrant ...• " 
360. Thus, MODEL RULES FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT, Search Warrant Execution, rule 207 
(Mar. 1974), says that 
[e]ntry into a vacant search site is permissible only if one of the following circumstances is 
present: 
(i) There is reason to believe the occupants will not be returning to the premises for an 
extended time period, if at all; or 
(ii) The investigation is likely to be frustrated or hampered if the premises are not imme· 
diately searched; or 
(iii) Returning to serve the warrant at another time will cause substantial inconvenience 
to the search team, and will improperly waste manpower. 
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entered does not per se mandate suppression, compliance with the reg-
ulation on another occasion certainly deserves consideration in decid-
ing that the warrant execution process was carried out in a reasonable 
fashion.361 
Though all this suggests that the Caceres approach is best, there is 
another possible alternative which, however, lies somewhat beyond 
current fourth amendment law. "There remains," as Judge McGowan 
wrote, "the interesting, albeit presently unresolvable, question of 
whether the judicial power could be exerted to compel the police to 
proceed by rule-making."362 Under this approach, as its principal ad-
vocate Amsterdam explains, 
(1) Unless a search or seizure is conducted pursuant to and in conform-
ity with either legislation or police departmental rules and regulations, it 
is an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the fourth amend-
ment. (2) The legislation or police-made rules must be reasonably par-
ticular in setting forth the nature of the searches and seizures and the 
circumstances under which they should be made. 363 
Certainly this alternative deserves further consideration. It would ex-
tend the advantages of police rulemaking across the entire breadth of 
fourth amendment activity, and of course would nullify the rationale 
of Caceres, as suppression for nonconformance with rules would not 
deter rulemaking if the rulemaking was itself constitutionally 
compelled. 
(ii) The context of judicial evaluation. In an exclusionary rule con-
text, as illustrated by Opperman, Bertine, Robinson, and Gustafson, the 
Supreme Court has failed to focus on the applicable police regulations 
as intensely as it might have. As previously note<;l, the fault may not 
be entirely that of the Court, for there is no tradition in such cases for 
the litigants to put the issues in a manner that would naturally direct 
attention to the entire range of activity covered by a specific police 
regulation. "Lawyers striving for victory in adversary litigation can-
not be expected invariably to put 'the individual case in the context of 
the overall enforcement policy involved.' "364 
361. Another illustration of the central point may be derived from United States v. Place, 
462 U.S. 696 (1983), holding that luggage may be briefly seized on reasonable suspicion but then 
concluding the particular seizure at issue was not of reasonable dimensions. The Court expressed 
concern with the failure of police to "make it absolutely clear how they plan to reunite the 
suspect and his possessions at some future time and place." 462 U.S. at 708 n.8. The Court did 
not mandate rulemaking on this subject, nor did it intimate that violation of some rule on lug-
gage seizure would itself necessitate suppression. It seems likely, however, that if in Place there 
had been a well thought out rule dealing with notification which the agents had complied with, 
the case would have looked much different to the Court. 
362. McGowan, supra note 35, at 684. 
363. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 416. 
364. McGowan, supra note 35, at 678. 
512 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 89:442 
Although one would hope that this will change over time as police 
rulemaking becomes more commonplace, past experience suggests 
that perhaps the judicial review function would be better performed in 
another context. Because "judicial review is most effective if it relates 
to carefully developed administrative policies rather than to the spo-
radic actions of individual police officers,"365 it may well be, as some 
have proposed, 366 that a more direct judicial review prompted by an 
injunction or declaratory judgment action is preferable. Sitz, however, 
illustrates that meaningful review is not a certainty even in this con-
text. Although the Court emphasized that it was the sobriety check-
point program on its face, rather than some particular seizure under 
the program, which was at issue, the Court nonetheless failed to scru-
tinize all the program's relevant guidelines. Another possibility would 
be some form of judicial review after promulgation but before imple-
mentation of the rules, a course which "has increasingly become a 
characteristic of general administrative law" and which, it has been 
suggested, "would appear to have significant advantages in respect of 
police rule-making."367 
Even if procedural barriers stand in the way of other interested 
parties obtaining such review,368 there are many instances in which the 
police themselves could (and might be well advised to) obtain preim-
plementation review. The vehicle for doing so, of course, is applica-
tion for a search warrant. Precisely this kind of review has been 
mandated in some circumstances (for example, under Camara) but not 
others. But, while the courts have not required that warrants be ob-
tained in advance for such activities as establishing a roadblock at a 
certain place and time, 369 police administrators would be well advised 
to obtain a warrant. Because these operations can be planned well in 
advance, there is no reason for not obtaining the prior approval of a 
magistrate. Such approval would minimize the chance of after-the-
fact challenge of the decisions regarding when, where and how the 
roadblock should be operated. 
Less apparent is the utility of a police-initiated judicial review of 
365. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 18-19. 
366. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 429; Quinn, supra note 31, at 35-36. 
367. McGowan, supra note 35, at 686. 
368. McGowan, supra note 35, at 688 comments: 
What is not perhaps so clear is the question of judicial power to grant such review at the 
instance of a party who has not yet become the object of the rules he seeks to attack. The 
issues are the familiar ones of standing and ripeness, with the latter being of predominant 
concern. 
369. See, e.g., United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976) (no warrant needed for 
illegal alien checkpoint); State v. Superior Court, 143 Ariz. 45, 691 P.2d 1073 (1984) (no warrant 
required for DWI checkpoint). 
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some broader policy which does not fit comfortably within the tradi-
tional warrant process. For example, if a law enforcement agency 
were to develop some sort of "profile" for deciding when to stop per-
sons suspected of a particular type of criminal activity, should the 
agency have available a mechanism to obtain an advance judicial 
· "stamp of approval" upon the profile? Especially if the procedure 
were to be ex parte, as with a warrant application, it is at least debata-
ble whether the review would likely be sufficiently intense or compre-
hensive to reveal the full range of fourth amendment concerns 
threatened by implementation of the policy. 
(iii) Custom versus policy. Another troubling characteristic of 
some of the Supreme Court's cases discussed earlier is that they sug-
gest a willingness to accept a vague and undocumented representation 
of the established practices of a particular police agency. In Opperman 
and Lafayette, for example, the only mention of the practices in Ver-
million and Kankakee regarding vehicle inventories and effects inven-
tories, respectively, is that the inventorying officer testified he acted 
pursuant to "standard procedure" in his department. In neither case 
is any police regulation ever quoted or even cited, and thus (as we have 
seen) there is lower court authority that the Bertine-mandated "stan-
dardized procedure" need not be memorialized in a written depart-
mental communication. This is unsettling for two reasons: (i) there is 
always the risk that such testimony will be self-serving and thus fail to 
represent accurately what the usual practice is; and (ii) even if it is the 
usual practice, it does not follow that it is the considered policy of the 
department. 
Reviewing courts must be more particular about separating mere 
custom from policy. As the President's Commission cautioned, the 
trouble with so-called standard procedures or policies which do not 
appear in a police manual or written set of standard operating proce-
dures is that they "have normally developed through customary prac-
tices that rarely are the product of careful analysis and are usually not 
well understood by patrolmen."370 Existing custom may on occasion 
tum out to provide a basis for official policy, but it is not the business 
of a court to transmogrify the former into the latter: What is neces-
sary is that there occur at the police level a "re-examination of estab-
lished methods," a "conscious decision as to whether familiar ways of 
doing things" are actually best. 371 Only if that process has occurred is 
there really policy entitled to deference from reviewing courts under 
370. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 189. 
371. McGowan, supra note 35, at 681. 
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the previously-discussed Romeo principle, for only then can the courts 
see clearly 
what it was that the police were doing in a particular case, and why they 
thought it necessary to do whatever they were doing, and what are the 
limitations and extensions in police logic of the claim of necessity that is 
advanced, and whether the claim of necessity advanced by the state's 
lawyers before the court is in fact the claim of necessity upon which the 
police acted or will ever act again, and whether the police believe in that 
claim seriously enough to express it in a general operating procedure.372 
(iv) Hunch versus expertise. A central feature of our legal system, 
in the elegant words of Karl Llewellyn, is that it 
entrusts its case-law-making to a body who are specialists only in being 
unspecialized, in being the official depositaries of as much general and 
balanced but rather uninformed horse sense as can be mustered. Such a 
body has as its function to be instructed, case by case, by the experts in 
any specialty, and then, by combination of its very nonexpertness in the 
particular with its general and widely buttressed expert roundedness in 
many smatterings, to reach a judgment which adds balance not only, as 
has been argued so often and so hard, against the passing flurries of pub-
lic passion, but no less against the often deep but too often jug-handled 
contributions of many technicians. 373 
With respect to the actions of police agencies and their officers, then, 
courts are not the experts but rather the intended recipients of exper-
tise from the police. One supposed benefit of a rulemaking regime is 
that it requires the ordering and communication of this knowledge and 
permits "the application of expertise on a continuous and systematic 
basis. " 374 
But, just as it is imperative to distinguish custom from policy, 
there is an equally compelling need to distinguish mere hunch from 
expertise, for it is the law enforcement policy grounded in the latter 
rather than the former which, under hard-look judicial review, is enti-
tled to judicial deference. (As suggested earlier, the unwillingness of 
courts to embrace the so-called "drug courier profile" seems largely 
attributable to the fact that courts were not provided solid data sup-
porting its predictive validity.) One difficulty in this area is the long-
standing uncertainty about which police attitudes and practices truly 
reflect expertise. There "has been little effort made to capitalize upon 
police experience or to attempt to assess its reliability: to distinguish 
accurate inferences from inaccurate ones; or to systematize experience 
so that it can be effectively communicated . . . to others, like judges, 
372. Amsterdam, supra note 5, at 419 (footnotes omitted). 
373. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 263. 
374. McGowan, supra note 35, at 678 (emphasis in original). 
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when the propriety of police action is challenged."375 Police agencies 
need "to undertake in-depth inquiries in support of policies and rules 
they decide to promulgate. It will not suffice, in establishing a policy, 
simply to assert an often-repeated but untested claim as to its 
value."376 Moreover, because an unadorned policy statement is un-
likely to be an adequate conduit of its underlying rationale or empiri-
cal basis, it is essential that police and prosecutors work together more 
effectively to ensure that this supporting data also reaches the review-
ing courts. When this occurs, the challenged police action is much 
more likely to receive a favorable judicial reaction. 377 
(v) How much rule, and how much discretion? "There is good dis-
cretion and bad discretion."378 To this apothegm might be added 
Llewellyn's precept that "to be right discretion, ... the action so far as 
it affects any man or group adversely must be undertaken with a feel-
ing, explicit or implicit, of willingness, of readiness, to do the like 
again, if, as, and when a like case may arise."379 If a major purpose of 
police rulemaking is to place realistic limits upon police discretion, 
then one mark of a reasonable regulation is that it serves to eliminate 
bad discretion by requiring that like cases actually be treated alike. 
But for the police administrator drafting the rule and the court review-
ing it, there is the nagging question of precisely how broadly or nar-
rowly this category of "like cases" ought to be defined. To take an 
issue considered earlier regarding Bertine, which is better: a rule that 
all arrestees' cars should be impounded (with perhaps one limited ex-
ception for a vehicle parked at the arrestee's premises), or a rule that 
an arrestee's car should be impounded only if neither parking at the 
scene nor turning the car over to another is feasible (then listing the 
myriad of factors which bear upon the feasibility of each of those alter-
natives)? What is lurking here, of course, is the old "bright lines" 
issue, which before now has been debated mainly with respect to the 
375. TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 41, at 20. 
376. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 118. 
377. See, e.g., State v. Coccomo, 177 N.J. Super. 575, 427 A.2d 131 (Law Div. 1980) (police 
decision as to where to locate DWI checkpoint upheld where court advised it placed on a road 
"where many bars are located" and where empirical data revealed that "seven fatal vehicular 
accidents," in most of which "alcohol abuse by the driver of a vehicle was a contributing factor," 
had occurred in the past two years); Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 337 S.E.2d 273 
(1985) (DWI roadblock upheld; court stresses plan developed after extensive research into loca-
tions within city where there had been driving while intoxicated arrests and alcohol-related acci-
dents), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986). 
378. Pepinsky, Better Living Through Police Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Au-
tumn 1984, at 249, 253. 
379. K. LLEWELLYN, supra note 13, at 217. 
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rules of police conduct promulgated by appellate courts. 380 Is it better 
that the police have the easily understood command, or is it better that 
they make fewer intrusions under a regulation which by virtue of its 
complexity will sometimes be misapplied and may sometimes serve to 
shield deliberate arbitrariness? 
Commentators on both sides of the rulemaking fence have warned 
that decisionmaking in law enforcement is often complex and thus 
ought not be compassed by overly simple rules. Professor Uviller, ap-
parently swimming against the rulemaking tide, has expressed his con-
cern this way: 
The solace of standardized rules and procedures is largely illusory. 
Rigid rules tend to ossify individual responsibility and discourage µtdi-
vidualistic thinking. Those who would shrink discretion obey the pre-
cept: "Treat likes alike." However, the overriding lesson of experience 
in our criminal justice operation is that every case is different. The ma-
jor worry is that the people out there dealing with the problems will lose 
their appreciation of the differences between the cases and will begin re-
acting to them as repetitive.381 
Similarly, Goldstein, though an advocate of police rulemaking, cau-
tions that "it is impossible to prescribe with any precision what should 
be done, since an infinite number of possible circumstances could oc-
cur." Thus for him intelligent rulemaking consists of alerting "officers 
to the alternatives available for dealing with a given situation, to the 
factors that should be considered in choosing from among available 
alternatives, and to the relative weight that should attach to each fac-
tor."382 Doubtless both Uviller and Goldstein would take a dim view 
of an impound-all-cars rule. 
We need to understand, however, that at the police level pressures 
will quite naturally push in the direction of the simplest possible rule, 
thus favoring, for example, the impound-all-cars alternative. This is 
best illustrated by a rulemaking development outside the fourth 
amendment area. In Stovall v. Denno 383 the Court held that the de-
fendant's one-on-one identification in lieu of a lineup was, under the 
circumstances, "so unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irrepara-
ble mistaken identification that he was denied due process of law." 
Lower courts, stressing the Court's use in Stovall of the "unnecessa-
rily" qualifier and its reference in another case to a police need 
380. Compare Alschuler, Bright Line Fever and the Fourth Amendment, 45 U. P1rr. L. REV. 
227 (1984) with LaFave, supra note 282. 
381. Uviller, The Unworthy Victim: Police Discretion in the Credibility Call 41 LAW & CON· 
TEMP. PROBS., Autumn 1984 at 15, 32. 
382. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 111-12. 
383. 388 U.S. 293, 302 (1967). 
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"swiftly tc:> determine whether they were on the right track,"384 have 
held that a one-on-one identification soon after the crime is permissible 
when a prompt lineup is not feasible. 385 The rulemaking response of 
the District of Columbia police department was not a regulation spell-
ing out the factors bearing upon that unfeasibility; rather, what 
emerged was the so-called "sixty minute rule,"386 the operation of 
which was described thusly by top department officials: 
Ifa suspect w[as] arrested within one hour of the time of the commission 
of the offense, in an area reasonably proximate to the scene of the of-
fense, he had to be returned to the scene for purposes of identification; if 
arrested after one hour, he could not be so returned. 387 
One leading advocate of police rulemaking asserted that this was pre-
cisely the kind of rule the police needed; in "a large metropolitan po-
lice department of 5100 men that investigates 800-1000 robberies a 
month," the officers must have "a simple, easily-applied rule."388 This 
is also the justification which was offered for the rule by the depart-
ment. "The result," the department spokesmen asserted, "is a rule 
more readily understood by those who must use it and therefore more 
vigorously enforced by those who must enforce it."389 Perhaps even 
more compelling proof of the strong police preference for the keep-it-
simple approach is that in another large urban department lacking 
such a straightforward guideline, the officers in the field nonetheless 
managed to convince themselves that a rule of this kind existed!390 
Much can be said for the Goldstein-Uviller thesis and also for the 
contrary approach deliberately adopted in the D.C. department. 
What this manifests is that the art/science of police rulemaking is be-
deviled by a collision of those antithetical dynamics which pervade our 
entire legal system; here again, we are confronted with the "conflict 
384. Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377, 385 (1968). 
385. E.g., United States v. Kessler, 692 F.2d 584 (9th Cir. 1982); State v. Hudson, 508 
S.W.2d 707 (Mo. App. 1974). 
386. Caplan, supra note 31, at 507. 
387. Wilson & Alprin, Controlling Police Conduct: Alternatives to the Exclusionary Rule, 36 
LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS., Winter 1971, at 488, 496. 
388. Caplan, supra note 31, at 507-08. 
389. Wilson & Alprin, supra note 387, at 497. 
390. H. UVILLER, TEMPERED ZEAL 107-09 (1988) (New York City). The situation here 
alluded to is helpfully summarized in Book Note, 87 MICH. L. R.Ev. 1311, 1312-13 (1989) (foot-
note and citation omitted): 
Uviller describes the precinct's almost comically persistent belief in the "two hour/two-mile 
rule." Uviller had protested at the officers' use of a "show-up" (a one-on-one exposure of 
suspect to victim for identification) instead of a regular line-up. The officers assured Uviller 
that because the show-up took place within two hours and two miles of the crime, its use 
was permissible, notwithstanding its suggestiveness and the feasibility of a traditional line-
up. When pressed to find the source of the rule, officers could only point to a dated depart-
mental memo which stated that under unusual circumstances when a line-up is impractica-
ble, one-on-one identification could be used instead. 
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between the simplicity of rules and the complexity of human experi-
ence."391 So it is that the "major challenge, in each art::a of police 
operations, is in deciding on the appropriate level of specificity for a 
given set of guidelines."392 
Although this means there is no ready solution to the previously-
stated query of how much rule and how much discretion is called for, 
a few observations are in order regarding the bright lines phenomenon 
in this setting: (1) If there are to be some bright lines in police rules, 
they should not inevitably be drawn as the Supreme Court has been 
inclined to draw them - by opting for that form of "brightness" 
which is most intrusive upon the interests of privacy and liberty,393 
There is some hope here, as experience has shown that a police regula-
tion might well "not seek to use the full authority granted by the case 
law," as when it "surrenders certain powers that are not seen as 
needed or helpful, even though granted by the courts. "394 (2) With 
respect to certain forms of police activity, a bright line may be the only 
constitutional choice. For example, Bertine makes that so with respect 
to the inventory of containers within vehicles. The Court left police 
departments with only two choices: a rule mandating inventory of the 
contents of virtually all such containers, 395 or a rule barring inventory 
of any of them. Doubtless this reflects a judgment that any less precise 
(even if more logical) intermediate rule provides too great an opportu-
nity for "slippage" - inconsistent action prompted either by misun-
derstanding or ulterior motives. The Court's holding may also 
manifest another instance of the previously discussed notion of repre-
sentative reinforcement at work: the Court may have concluded that 
the challenged police position, that inventory objectives cannot be re-
alized by merely sealing and storing containers, is entitled to credence 
only if the department is prepared to bear the political costs of total 
adherence to such a view by henceforth so intruding upon the privacy 
of all persons whose vehicles happen to be impounded and 
inventoried. 
* * * * 
Twenty-five years ago, the ABF Survey declared that police should 
"reduce their enforcement policies to writing and subject them to a 
391. Allen, The Nature of Discretion, 47 LAW & CONTEMP. PRODS., Autumn 1984, at 1, 3. 
392. H. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 31, at 112. 
393. See, e.g., New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981). 
394. Caplan, supra note 31, at 503-04. 
395. Consider the Blackmun interpretation of Bertine in the later Wells case, quoted in supra 
note 114. 
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continuing process of critical re-evaluation."396 With respect to law 
enforcement guidelines governing the search and seizure activities of 
police, the further assumption was that judicial review of these regula-
tions would occur and would ultimately result in a fourth amendment 
jurisprudence which more delicately balanced competing interests. 
The point of my assessment is not that such a system of rulemaking 
and review with such results is beyond accomplishment. Rather, it is 
that the processes of formulating police rules and subjecting them to 
meaningful review are not without difficulties, at least some of which 
may have either resulted from or accounted for the Supreme Court's 
own hesitancy either to stimulate rulemaking or to review challenged 
rules. Clearly much remains to be done. 
396. W. LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 513. 
